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CONTENTS

xix

CHAPTER VII

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SULLAN SYSTEM AND THE RISE OF POMPEY

By HUGH LAST and R. GARDNER¹

	PAGE
I. THE POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER SULLA'S DEATH	313
II. M. AEMILIUS LEPIDUS	314
Premonitory rumblings	315
The fatal blunder	316
III. THE APPOINTMENT OF POMPEY TO SPAIN	317
IV. SERTORIUS AND THE SERTORIAN WAR	318
Unrest in Spain	319
Sertorius master of Spain	321
The vicissitudes of warfare	322
The personality of Sertorius	325
V. THE DEMANDS FOR A RESTORATION OF THE <i>TRIBUNICIA POTESTAS</i>	326
Liberalism in the Senate	327
The weakness of the tribunes	328
VI. THE WAR OF THE GLADIATORS	329
Crassus in the field	331
VII. THE FIRST CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS	332
The army in politics again	333
The corruption of the courts	335
The scandal of Verres	336
<i>Tribuni aerarii</i>	338
The <i>Lex Aurelia Judiciaria</i>	340
VIII. TRIBUNICIAN LEGISLATION AGAIN: THE REFORMS OF 67 B.C.	341
Cornelius and the edicts	343
The tribunate at its best	344
IX. THE COMMANDS OF POMPEY	345
A step towards monarchy	347
The doom of the Republic	349

CHAPTER VIII

ROME AND THE EAST

By H. A. ORMEROD
and M. CARY, D.Litt.

Reader in Ancient History in the University of London²

I. THE PIRATES OF CILICIA	350
The growth of piracy	350
II. THE SECOND MITHRIDATIC WAR	353
Murena in Asia	353

¹ Sections I-III and V-IX are by Mr Last, section IV is by Mr Gardner.

² Sections I-VI are by Professor Ormerod, sections VII-X by Dr Cary.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
III. SERVILIUS VATIA AND ANTONIUS	354
Campaigns in Southern Asia Minor	354
IV. THE THIRD MITHRIDATIC WAR: THE CONQUEST OF PONTUS	356
Mithridates' preparations for war	357
The outbreak of war	358
The siege of Cyzicus	360
The advance into Pontus	363
The conquest of Pontus	364
V. LUCULLUS' INVASION OF ARMENIA	365
The battle of Tigranocerta	366
Invasion of Armenian highlands	369
Mithridates recovers Pontus	371
VI. THE CLIMAX OF PIRACY: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POMPEY	372
Depredations of the pirates	373
The reduction of piracy	374
VII. POMPEY'S CAMPAIGNS IN 66 B.C.	376
Roman alliance with Parthia	377
Final defeat of Mithridates	378
VIII. POMPEY'S LATER CAMPAIGNS	379
Pompey's progress to Syria	381
Capture of Jerusalem by Pompey	382
IX. EGYPT	383
Reign of Ptolemy Physcon	384
Dynastic discords in Egypt	386
Attitude of Rome to Egypt	389
X. POMPEY'S SETTLEMENT OF THE EAST	390
Death of Mithridates	391
Pompey's territorial settlement	392
Pompey's financial settlement	395

CHAPTER IX

THE JEWS

BY E. R. BEVAN, Hon. Litt.D. (Oxon.); Hon. LL.D. (St Andrews)
 Hon. Fellow of New College, Oxford, and Lecturer in Hellenistic History
 and Literature at King's College, London

I. JEWISH HISTORY TO THE RISE OF HEROD	397
Aristobulus I and Jannaeus	398
Salome, Hyrcanus II, Aristobulus II	401
The coming of Rome	402
Herod and Antigonus	404
II. JEWISH PARTIES AND THE LAW	406
Early Pharisaism a problem	406
The Scribes and the Synagogue	409
The tradition of the Elders	411
The Pharisees as a body	413
The Sadducees	415
New things in Pharisaism	416

CHAPTER VIII

ROME AND THE EAST

I. THE PIRATES OF CILICIA

IN his hurried settlement of the East after the defeat of Mithridates there were many problems which Sulla had to leave to his successors. One of the most pressing was that which concerned the pirates of the southern coasts of Asia Minor, whose fleets had given Mithridates valuable help in the late war and whose activities, in spite of the Roman victory, continued unabated. The growth of their extraordinary power was largely the result of Roman negligence during the preceding century. The decline of Rhodes, the weakness of Egypt, and above all the restrictions placed by Rome on the activities of the kings of Syria had all combined to give the natives of Cilicia a freedom from restraint which enabled them to develop their predatory instincts to the utmost. The terms imposed on Antiochus after the battle of Magnesia had limited his navy to ten ships of war and prevented him from sending any armed vessel to the west of Cape Sarpedonium (vol. VIII, p. 229), with the result that, since in Cilicia Tracheia lateral communication is almost impossible for a large force, the whole district became independent of Syria, and of little interest to its kings, except in so far as it provided from time to time a convenient base for pretenders to the Syrian throne. It is indeed to one of these pretenders, Diodotus Tryphon, that Strabo¹ ascribes the origin of piracy on the Cilician coast. Diodotus had established himself in the stronghold of Coracesium, which he used as a base for his privateers. His followers made Coracesium henceforward the headquarters of Cilician malpractices. During the last quarter of the second century B.C. these activities became widely extended over the eastern Mediterranean, the 'golden sea'

Note. The chief sources for the narrative in this chapter are Livy, *Epit.* 90-102, Plutarch's *Lucullus* and *Pompey* (24-45), Appian, *Mithridatica*, 64-119, Memnon, fragments of *History of Heraclea*, xv-xvi, Dio xxxvi-xxxvii, 23, Justin xxxviii-xl, and passages from Cicero, Strabo and Josephus, for which see the Bibliography.

¹ XIV, 668.

from Cyrene to Crete and the Peloponnese yielding a rich harvest to the freebooters¹.

For some years the Roman government confined itself to diplomatic representations to the States held to be responsible, and it was not until the close of the century that any direct action was undertaken against the pirates themselves. One of the reasons of this apathy had undoubtedly been the part which the pirates played as wholesale purveyors of slaves to the ancient world. The port of Delos could dispose of slaves in tens of thousands (vol. VIII, p. 644) and was openly frequented by their boats; Side on the Pamphylian coast provided them with a market almost as valuable. The pirates, therefore, fulfilled an important function in the economic life of the day and as kidnappers and slave merchants were equalled only by the Roman tax-farmers. At last, however, the complaints of the provincials and allied States had their effect. When, in reply to a demand for a contingent in the Cimbrian war, Nicomedes of Bithynia pleaded that the majority of his subjects had been carried off by tax-farmers and were now in slavery², the Senate decreed that all enslaved allies of free birth should be set free in the provinces, and ordered governors to see that the decree was carried out. Against the other chief purveyors of human goods an expedition was fitted out in 102 B.C. and M. Antonius was dispatched to the Cilician coasts. The offensive against the pirates was supplemented by a measure passed about the year 100 B.C., which definitely excluded them from the ports of the empire and of allied states³.

The extent of Antonius' success, for which the customary triumph was decreed, is difficult to estimate. It is true that little is heard of the pirates for some years, and that the campaign was followed by the creation of the province of Cilicia. There is however nothing to show that this included anything more than the Pamphylian lowlands. Cilicia Pedias was not brought under Roman control until a later date; even if nominally reduced by Antonius, Cilicia Tracheia and eastern Lycia soon obtained their independence; parts of Pamphylia itself, which had supported Lucullus in the First Mithridatic War (p. 241), again fell into the hands of the pirates. In territory, therefore, the province was of small extent, the intention of the government being rather to

¹ Florus I, 41 (III, 6), 1-3; cf. Dio xxvii, frag. 93, for a Cilician pirate occupying Macella in Sicily c. 102 B.C.

² Diodorus xxxvi, 3.

³ *S.E.G.* III, 378. On the date of this inscription, see the works cited in the Bibliography.

provide a base of operations against the pirates and a post of observation for southern Asia Minor in general.

The small success which attended the first of these objects may be estimated from the subsequent history of the pirates. Since the days of his famous tour in Asia Minor (p. 234) Mithridates had been fully aware of the value of the addition of their vessels to his own. At the outbreak of the first war his fleets were increased by the irregular squadrons of the pirates, whose activities it is not easy to distinguish from those of the Pontic navy. During the course of the war, when it became clear that the king would be unable to hold his conquests, greater license was granted to the Cilicians, whose organization was already reaching the perfection attained by the time of the Third Mithridatic War¹. With the withdrawal of Mithridates' forces the depredations of the pirates continued unabated. Even after the conclusion of peace, the coasts of Asia Minor and the islands were still being scourged by these bands, who are reported to have sacked the temple of Samothrace while Sulla himself was in the island. Moreover, by this time their cruises were extended over the whole of the Mediterranean, if it is true that the pirates who co-operated with Sertorius in 81 B.C. were Cilicians².

Sulla had himself held the Cilician command and was fully aware of the difficulties which beset any attempt to achieve a final solution of the pirate problem. No reduction of the strongholds of the coast could be permanent without a complete subjugation of the whole of the Taurus, into the recesses of which the pirates of the coast could retire when attacked, and from which they could be reinforced at need by the brigand tribes of the hills. As the result of the First Mithridatic War the whole of southern Asia Minor was disturbed. The inhabitants of Cilicia Tracheia were supported by the inland tribes of the Isaurians; the Pisidian highlanders were noted for their predatory habits; important towns in Pamphylia, such as Attaleia and Side, were openly leagued with the pirates; in Lycia, a robber chieftain, Zenicetes, had made himself master of the Solyma mountains and the eastern coast. Accordingly, before the death of Sulla, a scheme of operations was drafted, which, though twice interrupted by fresh outbreaks of war with Mithridates, aimed at the penetration of the whole of this district from west to east and the subjugation of the tribes on both sides of the Taurus. A beginning was made by Sulla's successor, L. Murena, who occupied a part of the hinterland of Lycia, the Cibyrtis, as the preliminary to a move on Zenicetes. Murena also

¹ Appian, *Mithr.* 63.

² Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 7.

collected a fleet for use against the pirates of the coast, but any further operations in this district were for the time prevented by a renewal of the war with Mithridates.

II. THE SECOND MITHRIDATIC WAR

Since the conclusion of peace Mithridates had been engaged in the re-organization of his kingdom and the suppression of revolts in Colchis and the Cimmerian Bosphorus. Disaffection in Colchis had been appeased by the re-appointment of the king's son, Mithridates (Philopator Philadelphus¹), as regent, although the young man was shortly recalled and put to death. Against the Bosphorans Mithridates was preparing an expedition on a large scale, which was regarded with disfavour by Murena in view of the fact that the king had not yet restored the whole of the kingdom of Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes. Murena's expectation, real or pretended, that Mithridates was once more preparing for war with Rome was increased by the arrival of Archelaus, the king's general in the late war, who professed to confirm his suspicions. On this pretext he marched through Cappadocia and attacked Comana. The king at once appealed to the treaty, but since it had not been reduced to writing, its existence was denied by Murena, now wintering in Cappadocia (83-82 B.C.). While the ambassadors sent by the king to appeal to the Senate were on their way, Murena began another raid across the Halys, overrunning 400 villages in the king's territory and returning with his booty to Phrygia and Galatia. Here he was met by Calidius, who in answer to Mithridates' representations had been sent out by the Senate with orders that the king was to be left in peace; but what was believed to be a secret understanding between the two men induced Murena again to attack. This time he advanced directly on Sinope². In self-defence Mithridates concentrated his forces against the invader. His general, Gordius, by a threat to Roman territory compelled Murena to fall back. Mithridates himself, coming up with the main body, joined Gordius³ and inflicted a decisive defeat on the Roman army, which was compelled to retreat hurriedly into Phrygia.

The king had driven all Murena's garrisons from Cappadocia and appeared to be about to follow up his victory, when a peremptory message arrived from Sulla ordering Murena to refrain from further hostilities and enjoining Mithridates to be reconciled

¹ *O.G.I.S.* 375.

² Memnon 36.

³ Probably on the Halys; see Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator*, p. 303.

with Ariobarzanes. Sulla's orders were carried out by both parties, Mithridates securing an additional slice of Cappadocia at the expense of Ariobarzanes and Murena receiving the ill-earned salutation of *imperator*¹ and later a triumph².

III. SERVILIUS VATIA AND ANTONIUS

The work of reducing southern Asia Minor, which had been thus interrupted by the Second Mithridatic War and was not resumed during the Cilician governorship of Dolabella (80–79 B.C.), was once more taken up by the Roman government in 78 B.C. and entrusted to the consul of the preceding year, P. Servilius Vatia. In continuation of Murena's work in the Cibyratis Servilius' first task was the suppression of Zenicetes in eastern Lycia. The territory of Zenicetes, an immigrant Cilician or more probably a native chieftain who styled himself king³, comprised the whole of the eastern coast of Lycia with the towns of Phaselis, Corycus and Olympus, together with most of the Solyma mountains, the massive spur of the Taurus which overhangs the western shore of the Pamphylian Gulf and terminates in the Chelidonian promontory. The inhabitants of this district were, with the exception of the Greeks of Phaselis, far behind the rest of the inhabitants of Lycia in civilization and differed perhaps from them in race. From the Solyma mountains Zenicetes could overrun the Pamphylian plain, much of which he had occupied.

The first months of Servilius' command were devoted to preparations for the campaign, in particular to the raising of a fleet. In 77 B.C. he was able to open an attack on the Lycian coast. The enemy were defeated, probably off the Chelidonian islands⁴, and the three coastal cities were captured. Servilius then reduced the hill country and stormed the mountain stronghold of Zenicetes, who perished with his household in the flames which he himself had kindled. The disloyal districts of Pamphylia were recovered, and the people of Attaleia were punished by confiscation of territory⁵.

It is generally held that Servilius' operations in Lycia and

¹ Ditt.³ 745; Cicero, *pro Murena*, 5, 12.

² Cicero, *de imp. Cn. Pompei*, 3, 8.

³ Carapanos, *Dodone*, p. 107, xxvi, n. 8, 1. (See E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte d. Seeraubs*, p. 111, no. 94.)

⁴ O.G.I.S. 552, a Lycian contingent under Aechmon of Xanthus supporting the Romans (see Dittenberger's notes *ad loc.*).

⁵ Cicero, *de lege agr.* 1, 2, 5.

Pamphylia were followed by an attack on the pirate strongholds of Cilicia Tracheia. There is, however, not a single point in Cilicia Tracheia which Servilius can be said to have captured or even attacked. The general plan of operations did, in fact, postulate that the northern face of the Taurus must first be cleared before any attempt was made to enter Cilicia Tracheia itself. The Lycian and Pamphylian part of his campaign had been completed by the year 76. In the following year Servilius was free to clear the northern face of the central Taurus range.

In this district Servilius is known to have reduced the people of the Isauri with their two fortresses Isaura Vetus and Isaura Nova. Cicero¹ mentions also territory taken from the Orondeis together with the otherwise unknown ager Aperensis and Gedusanus. The latter is perhaps a corruption of Sedasanus², Sedasa being a town of the Homonadeis, a tribe finally reduced by the Romans in 10-7 B.C. The combined territory of the two peoples extended from Lake Caralis on the west to the confines of the Isaurians, the reduction of whom, covering as they did the principal approaches from the north, cleared the way for an advance by land into Cilicia Tracheia.

The campaign against the Isaurians had been concluded in the year 75. The following year saw the creation of a special command which was intended to sweep the pirates from the seas, while their homes in the Taurus could be threatened from the north. But the Roman plan miscarried: on the land side operations were delayed by the death of L. Octavius, the consul of 75 B.C. (who had been appointed to succeed Servilius in Cilicia in 74 but died soon after taking up his command), and then brought to a standstill by the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War.

At sea in this year, 74 B.C., a special command had been conferred on the praetor, M. Antonius, which anticipated that entrusted to Pompey in 67 B.C., and gave to Antonius control over the Roman fleets and the coasts of the Mediterranean for three years (see above, p. 347). On the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief the appointment promised success. The extortions carried out by Antonius and his subordinates are said to have proved even more grievous to the provincials than the depredations of the pirates³. But Antonius himself was utterly incompetent. No organized plan to clear the Mediterranean, such as

¹ *de lege agr.* II, 19, 50.

² *J.R.S.* XII, 1922, p. 47.

³ Sallust, *Hist.* III, 2, M. An inscription from Gytheum (Ditt.³ 748) refers eloquently to the necessities of the town 'when Antonius was present.'

later characterized the work of Pompey, can be traced. It is true that we hear of operations on the Spanish coast¹, which may have been intended to clear the western seas, but Antonius' principal achievement, the attack on Crete, even if justified, was of quite secondary importance to the reduction of the Cilician coast. The Cretans, whose record in the matter of piracy was not above reproach (vol. VIII, pp. 145, 291, 627), were accused of supporting Mithridates and supplying him with mercenaries, of supporting the pirates and providing them with a refuge when pursued by Antonius. A war was forced on them which ended in disaster for the Romans and a humiliating peace concluded before the death of Antonius (71 B.C.). The peace was naturally disregarded by the government, which found itself, as the result of Antonius' command, faced with a new Cretan war (below, p. 375), while the pirates, as the result of Roman incompetence, showed themselves possessed of a new confidence and daring which amazed the ancient world.

IV. THE THIRD MITHRIDATIC WAR: THE CONQUEST OF PONTUS

After the cessation of Murena's raids in 81 B.C., Mithridates had resumed the task of recovering his Bosporan possessions (p. 353), where his son Machares was now appointed viceroy. To open communication by land with the newly recovered territory a further expedition was launched against the tribes of the Achaei beyond Colchis. The expedition, however, failed with heavy losses, two-thirds of the force being lost either in battle or from the climate. Mithridates then returned to his kingdom, where, as the result of representations made by Ariobarzanes to Rome, he received orders from Sulla to surrender those parts of Cappadocia which he still held. Once again the king obeyed and sent an embassy to Rome to secure formal ratification of the Peace of Dardanus. Before its arrival Sulla had died (78 B.C.), and since nothing could be obtained from the Senate, Mithridates incited his son-in-law, Tigranes, to occupy Cappadocia, from which some 300,000 of the inhabitants are said to have been carried off to swell the population of Tigranocerta, the new capital of Armenia.

The sultan of the now united Armenia was the descendant of the Artaxiad rulers of north-eastern Armenia or Armenia proper (vol. VIII, p. 514). A part of his youth had been spent as a hostage

¹ Sallust, *Hist.* III, 5-6, M.

among the Parthians, his restoration being secured only by the surrender of seventy Armenian valleys to the Parthian king. After his accession in 95 B.C., Tigranes, backed by Mithridates of Pontus, utilized to the full the opportunity offered by the weakness of the Parthian kingdom which followed the death of Mithridates II. By the conquest of Sophene the whole of Armenia was united under his rule, while his frontiers were extended by the annexation of the northern provinces of the Parthian empire (see further below, p. 603). By 83 B.C. he had annexed the remnant of the Seleucid kingdom in Syria and Cilicia, from which, as later from Cappadocia, numbers of the inhabitants were transported to Tigranocerta. In the matter of territory Tigranes was now the most powerful monarch of the East, to the formal suzerainty of which he laid claim by the assumption of the title 'King of Kings.'

Besides the friendship of Tigranes, Mithridates could rely in the coming struggle with Rome on the co-operation of the Cilicians, whose naval power, at any rate, was untouched by the victories of Servilius Isauricus. The benevolent neutrality of the kings of Egypt and Cyprus had been secured by dynastic alliances¹. In Europe his Bosporan agents could foment disturbances among the tribes of the Danube and the Haemus, and create a serious menace to the Roman province of Macedonia. During the years preceding the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War the governors of Macedonia had been constantly engaged in repelling incursions into the province and in retaliatory expeditions into barbarian territory, but, so long as the power of Mithridates remained intact, they could achieve few permanent results. Although Appius Claudius is credited with victories over the Thracians and Sarmatians in 78 B.C., and his successor C. Scribonius Curio is stated to have penetrated to the Danube and ended the war in 75 B.C., it was not until the power of Mithridates had been broken by L. Lucullus, that his brother Marcus, the governor of Macedonia, was able to gain any permanent success². Deprived of support from Mithridates, the Bessi and Dardani were defeated in a number of engagements; the whole of the country between the Haemus and the

¹ Appian, *Mithr.* III, states that the two daughters of Mithridates had been betrothed to the kings of Egypt and Cyprus, who are presumably the two illegitimate sons of Ptolemy Lathyrus. See below, p. 388, and E. R. Bevan, *History of Egypt*, p. 344 sq.

² Eutropius VI, 2; VI, 7; Florus I, 39 (III, 4), 6; Orosius V, 23; VI, 3; Livy, *Epit.* 91, 92, 95, 97. There is no confirmation of Florus' statement that M. Lucullus reached the Tanais and Lake Maeotis.

Danube was systematically laid waste and the fighting men mutilated. Even the Greek cities on the coast of the Black Sea, Apollonia, Callatis, Tomi and Istros, were captured and plundered. The results of the campaign deprived Mithridates of one of the most valuable of his recruiting grounds and would have rendered abortive the design, with which he is credited after the fall of his Asiatic kingdom, of invading Europe from the Crimea (p. 391).

In the far west Mithridates sought another ally. Through the agency of two of the refugees from the Fimbrian army, Magius and Fannius, he opened negotiations with Sertorius in Spain, offering ships and money in return for the recognition of his own claims to Asia Minor. To the surprise of the king the demand was refused on the ground that it was impossible for Sertorius to consent to the surrender of any Roman territory. Sertorius, however, professed himself willing to admit the claims of Mithridates to Bithynia and Cappadocia, and undertook to supply officers to instruct the Pontic armies in Roman methods of warfare, a certain M. Marius accompanying the ambassadors on their return to Pontus (see above, p. 322 *sq.*).

The war, which both sides had foreseen and in view of which the Roman government had retained a force of four legions in Asia Minor¹, was kindled once again by the Bithynian succession. Late in the year 75 or early in 74 B.C. the worthless Nicomedes III had died, leaving, as the Romans claimed, no legitimate heir to the throne. Bithynia was declared a province, temporary arrangements for its annexation being entrusted to the governor of Asia². That Bithynia and the control of the entrance to the Black Sea should pass entirely into Roman hands was intolerable to Mithridates, who declared himself the protector of an alleged son of Nicomedes and Nysa, and marched through Paphlagonia to invade Bithynia. At the same time a force was sent into Cappadocia under Diophantus, to garrison the towns and cover Pontus against attack from Cilicia. Now or later, Eumachus was dispatched into Phrygia, who, after creating trouble among the Pisidians and Cilicians in the south, was finally driven out by the Galatian Deiotarus³.

The Romans were caught at a disadvantage. Octavius, the governor of Cilicia, had died in his province in 74 B.C. M. Juncus,

¹ Sallust, *Hist.* II, 47 M.

² Vell. Pat. II, 42.

³ Appian, *Mithr.* 75. His expulsion took place before the winter 74-73. There is a similar doubt about the date of the penetration of Marius into Asia (Plutarch, *Sert.* 24; Suet. *Div. Iul.* 4).

the governor of Asia, if we may judge from the fact that the young Julius Caesar did not hesitate to act against him or instead of him, was incompetent or had already been recalled¹. Fresh commanders had therefore to be sent out from Rome, and after much debate and intrigue the consuls of 74 B.C. were appointed, M. Aurelius Cotta to the new province of Bithynia, L. Lucullus to the command of the forces in Asia and Cilicia.

The story of Lucullus' intrigue with Praecia, mistress of the political wire-puller Cethegus, to secure the command, whatever light it may throw on contemporary politics in Rome, does not alter the fact that Lucullus, in the absence of Pompey, was the only suitable officer available for the post. As quaestor to Sulla and later to Murena he had gained an intimate knowledge of affairs in Asia Minor, winning good opinions among the provincials for his justice and moderation. Both in Sulla's campaigns and later at the siege of Mitylene (p. 260), he had shown himself to be a capable officer, who had little to learn from the military textbooks he is said to have studied on his journey eastward.

The plan agreed between the two commanders was that Cotta should hold Mithridates in check in Bithynia, and with the help of a fleet gathered from the allies close the Bosphorus against the Pontic navy. Lucullus, who brought with him one fresh legion, was to unite the veteran legions of Servilius in Cilicia with the Fimbrian legions in Asia², and advance through Phrygia against Mithridates' flank. His advance was delayed by the lack of discipline among the Fimbrian troops and the general state of affairs in the province of Asia. Lucullus had only reached the Sangarius when he heard that his colleague, who had been forced to retire on Chalcedon, had rashly offered battle to Mithridates' main forces and suffered a complete defeat. Although the fortress itself held out, the Pontic fleet had forced its way into the harbour, destroying four of the Roman vessels and capturing sixty.

The most serious part of the disaster was the loss of the fleet. For the rest the dangerous position in which the rapid advance of Mithridates had placed his army was aggravated by his determination to complete the conquest of the Propontis and enter the province of Asia from the north. A force was detached under the Sertorian Marius to observe Lucullus, now advancing from the Sangarius, which established contact with him at Otryae, near

¹ Vell. Pat. *loc. cit.*; Suet. *loc. cit.*

² Lucullus is credited with 30,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry (Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 8; Appian, *Mithr.* 72, puts the cavalry at 1600).

Lake Ascania¹. When Marius was about to offer battle, the engagement was broken off by the appearance of a thunderbolt, and he was compelled by lack of provisions to retire. In the meantime, the king was hurrying towards Cyzicus, whose citizens had suffered heavy losses in the fighting at Chalcedon, and whose capture in the eyes of Mithridates would open the gate into Asia². Evading the Roman army, Mithridates arrived first before the town and occupied the high ground, known as the Adrasteian hill, which fronts the city across the narrow strait separating it from the mainland³.

The city of Cyzicus lay on the island of Arctonnesus, which has roughly the shape of a triangle with the apex turned towards the mainland⁴. At the present time the island is joined to the mainland by an isthmus some three-quarters of a mile wide, but at the time of the siege it was separated by a narrow strait spanned only by a single causeway⁵. The city itself lay at the apex of the triangle on low land facing the Asiatic shore. Mithridates, transferring the bulk of his forces to the island, brought up his fleet to blockade the strait and established his troops in ten camps round the town. Lucullus, arriving on his heels, occupied the so-called Thracian village behind Adrasteia, from which the supplies of the enemy could be threatened. The position of the king's army was serious enough for an investing force; it rapidly became precarious when, with the help of treachery on the part of the renegade Magius, Lucullus was able to seize the heights of Adrasteia and sever the king's communications with the mainland.

Only the early capitulation of Cyzicus could save the Pontic army from disaster, and all the energies of the king were directed to the storming of the town before the approach of winter interrupted the supplies which were reaching him by sea. For a time the citizens were ignorant of Lucullus' position, and it was not until he could send a vessel through the blockading squadron that certain information reached the town. Realizing that the success of Lucullus' plans depended on their own successful resistance, and heartened by a sudden storm which overthrew many of the enemy's siege engines, the Cyzicenes were encouraged to hold out to the last. In its cramped position on the island the investing

¹ Strabo XII, 566 (Otroea); see Sir W. M. Ramsay, *Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, p. 189.

² Cicero, *pro Murena*, 15, 33.

³ Strabo XII, 575. See F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus*, p. 48.

⁴ Hasluck, *op. cit.* pp. 1-4.

⁵ Frontinus, *Strat.* IV, 13, 6. In Strabo's time (XII, 575) there were two.

force was already suffering from disease. By the winter the commissariat had broken down, and the troops were reduced to feeding on herbs or even human flesh. After a last desperate attempt to capture the town, Mithridates reluctantly consented to abandon the siege. First the cavalry with the baggage animals and the sick were sent away secretly into Bithynia. Though the pursuit was hampered by a snowstorm, Lucullus overtook and annihilated the retreating force on the Rhyndacus. Some 30,000 infantry seeking to withdraw to Lampsacus were caught at the crossings of the swollen Aesepus and Granicus; a mere remnant reached their destination, where they were embarked by the Pontic fleet. It was only his command of the sea that enabled Mithridates to save himself and the remainder of his army. Even so, many lives were lost at the embarkation in a panic caused or aggravated by an attack of the Cyzicenes on the camp, where the sick and wounded were ruthlessly butchered.

Though his fleet had suffered losses in a storm off Parium, Mithridates still hoped by its means to maintain himself in the Propontis. Marius was sent with 50 ships and 10,000 picked troops to create a diversion in the Aegean, and the king himself sailed to Perinthus, in the hope of opening communication with his European allies. Failing to take the town he retired to Nicomedeia. Lucullus elected to deal himself with Marius. It would appear that he had already made arrangements with the cities of Asia for the provision of a fleet and was able to decline the subsidy offered by the Senate for that purpose. A portion of the new fleet was placed at the disposal of his lieutenants, C. Valerius Triarius and Barba, who received orders to reduce the Propontis and the points in western Bithynia held by Mithridates. They are credited with the reduction of Apamea (Myrleia) and Cius on the coast, inland, of Prusa and of Nicaea, whose garrison withdrew to join Mithridates in Nicomedeia. Lucullus himself, passing through the Hellespont, annihilated the forces under Marius in two engagements off Tenedos and Lemnos.

The position of Mithridates at Nicomedeia was no longer tenable. Little remained to him in the Propontis; Cotta, moving out from Chalcedon, joined forces with Triarius and prepared to blockade the town by land. After his victories in the Aegean Lucullus sent forward Voconius with a part of his fleet to close the entrance to the gulf, preparing himself to follow with the rest. But Voconius, engrossed in the mysteries of Samothrace, allowed the king to escape into the Black Sea. Although what remained to him of his fleet suffered further losses in a storm, Mithridates him-

self, who had been rescued when in danger of shipwreck by his pirate friends, eventually reached Amisus in safety. So ended the first phase of the campaign (73 B.C.). The whole of his initial conquests had been lost and with them a large part of his army; the fleet was destroyed or scattered, even a squadron which at the beginning of the campaign had been sent to Crete and Spain being later caught and destroyed on its return by Triarius off Tenedos¹.

Arrived at Amisus, Mithridates sent urgent demands for help to Tigranes, to Machares in the Bosphorus, and even to the kings of Scythia and Parthia. At no other time perhaps does Mithridates approach nearer to greatness. His allies were lukewarm, his friends and dependents thought only of making favourable terms for themselves with the Romans. Diocles, his envoy to the Scythians, deserted to Lucullus with the gold entrusted to him; Metrodorus of Scepsis frankly advised Tigranes to refrain from embroiling himself with the Romans; the court itself was full of traitors, if we may judge from the account which Strabo gives of his own relatives of the house of Dorylaeus, the king's friend and foster-brother². Nevertheless Mithridates resolutely set himself to the defence of his kingdom. On his journey to Amisus he had been fortunate enough to secure the town of Heraclea, into which he had thrown a strong garrison. That fortress and the towns of the Paphlagonian coast, together with Sinope, would inevitably detain a part of the Roman forces on their advance into Pontus. In the country itself he relied on a network of strongly garrisoned fortresses covering the principal roads in the western part of the kingdom³. Of these the most powerful, Amasia, Amisus on the coast, Themiscyra and Eupatoria, formed roughly a square, behind which Mithridates set himself to assemble a new army at Cabeira. His cavalry was still formidable⁴ and was to be used to restrict further the Roman freedom of movement.

Lucullus, Cotta and Triarius had united their forces at Nicomedeia and prepared for an immediate invasion of Pontus. As Mithridates had foreseen, the Romans were compelled to detach a portion of their forces to reduce the Paphlagonian coast, this duty being entrusted to Cotta, who was to receive the naval sup-

¹ Memnon 48. A Milesian bireme, 'Parthenos,' serving with Triarius, *O.G.I.S.* 447.

² Strabo x, 478; xii, 558.

³ Strabo xii, 557, ascribes the betrayal of no less than fifteen forts to his maternal grandfather.

⁴ (Appian *Mithr.* 78) and Plutarch (*Lucullus*) 14, set it at 4000, against the 8000 of Memnon 43.

port of Triarius when he had dealt with the remainder of the king's fleet in the Aegean (p. 362). Heraclea surprised the Romans by its prolonged resistance of two years, its capture being followed by the surrender of Tius and Amastris. It was not until the king himself had been overthrown that Lucullus could effect the reduction of Sinope (probably in 70 B.C.).

Realizing the necessity of an immediate attack on Mithridates, Lucullus had begun his advance into Pontus before the summer of 73 B.C. had come to an end. In his choice of route the existence of the Pontic garrisons on the coast may well have decided him to avoid the trunk road by the Amnias valley, which would have brought him most directly into Pontus, and to adopt a more southerly line through Galatia, where the difficulties of supplying his troops on the march were met only by the friendly offices of Galatian porters supplied by Deiotarus. When he had crossed the Halys, Lucullus, leaving Amasia and Eupatoria on his right, marched between the Halys and the Iris on Amisus, the 'maritime capital'¹ of Pontus, through which Mithridates could receive reinforcements from his son Machares in Bosphorus. Having plundered the country up to Themiscyra, he sat down to besiege Amisus, which, however, Mithridates was able to provision through the winter from Cabeira.

In the following spring (72 B.C.), leaving Murena with two legions to continue the siege, Lucullus marched with three legions against the main forces of Mithridates at Cabeira. The route which he must follow would take him by way of Themiscyra and Eupatoria, a fortress not yet fully completed, which, lying at the junction of the Iris and the Lycus, closed the approach to Cabeira by the Lycus valley. So contradictory are our authorities that it is impossible to say with certainty at what stage of the campaign the fortress was captured. Memnon² states quite definitely that Lucullus assaulted and captured Eupatoria after the operations at Cabeira were finished, but since he makes the same statement regarding Lucullus' attack on Amisus, which was certainly invested by the summer of 73 B.C., it is probable that Eupatoria, whose very existence barred any advance by the Romans up the Lycus valley, was captured, or, as Appian hints³, betrayed, before help could come from the main Pontic army. The movement against Cabeira

¹ J. A. R. Munro, *J.H.S.* XXI, 1901, p. 52, whose account of the campaign has been followed in general. On the topographical and chronological difficulties presented by these campaigns see below, Note 4, p. 897 sq.

² Memnon 45.

³ *Mithr.* 115.

was in any case a bold one on the part of Lucullus; with Eupatoria still standing, it would have been foolhardy, if not impossible.

On his arrival in the Lycus valley, Lucullus found his movements seriously hampered by the enemy cavalry, which dominated the low ground and heavily defeated the Roman horse. Mithridates had himself moved out from Cabeira down the valley with a view to cutting the communications of the Romans and forcing them into the hills, when Lucullus, guided by Greek prisoners from the locality by a route along the edge of the hills, appeared above Cabeira and occupied a strong point threatening the town. His new position was secure from direct attack, but he was cut off from his communications with the force at Amisus and dependent for supplies on a route southwards into Cappadocia, which crossed the Lycus valley dominated by Mithridates' cavalry. The rest of the campaign turned on the king's ability to intercept the Roman convoys. We have accounts of three engagements, the first of which, a mere skirmish, Mithridates claimed as a victory. In the second ten cohorts under Sornatius, escorting the supply train from the south, were violently attacked by Mithridates' troops but succeeded in beating them off. In the third a Pontic force comprising half the cavalry and 4000 infantry, which had been sent out to intercept a convoy protected by a force of legionaries under M. Fabius Hadrianus, unwisely attacked the Romans in a defile where the cavalry could not operate, and suffered a complete defeat. Exaggerated accounts of the reverse, which Mithridates had attempted to minimize, filled the Pontic camp. The king, who with the loss of half his cavalry had lost his superiority over Lucullus, appears to have expected an attack in force by the Romans and was making preparations to retire, when his intentions became known and a general panic arose in the camp. In the confusion Mithridates nearly lost his life, but was able to escape to Comana; his army was dispersed or cut up by the Romans. Lucullus at once urged the pursuit of the king, who was in imminent danger of capture by the Roman cavalry. He was saved only by the scattering of the treasure from the pack of one of his baggage mules. Though the Romans followed as far as Talaura, the treasure hunt had given him too long a start. Sending orders that the ladies of his harem at Pharnaceia should be put to death, Mithridates abandoned his kingdom and took refuge with Tigranes.

After the victory at Cabeira Lucullus received the surrender of the town, where he spent the winter of 72-71 B.C. There followed the reduction of Armenia Minor, of the tribes on the coast as far as Pharnaceia, and of Amisus, which had resisted through a second

winter. With the fall of Sinope and Amasia, which was delayed perhaps by Lucullus' absence in the province of Asia, the conquest of Pontus was complete (70 B.C.). Before the capitulation of Sinope, Lucullus had already made a convention with Machares in the Bosphorus, thus securing the cessation of the supplies which were reaching the town by sea.

Before the capture of Amisus (71 B.C.), Lucullus had sent his brother-in-law, Appius Claudius, to Tigranes to demand the surrender of Mithridates. The months which remained before his return were largely spent by Lucullus in regulating the affairs of Asia. The cities of the province were crushed beneath the huge indemnity imposed by Sulla (p. 259) and the exactions of the moneylenders and tax-farmers. Lucullus made arrangements for the indemnity to be met by a tax of 25 per cent. on crops, house-property and slaves. The measure appears drastic but provided an organized method of meeting the payments due, and was beneficial in its results. The extortions of the moneylenders were curtailed by fixing the rate of interest at 12 per cent., arrears of interest which exceeded the principal being disallowed; on the other hand, the rights of creditors were secured by guaranteeing to them annual payment of sums not exceeding one-fourth of a debtor's income. The advantages to the province were enormous, but it is not surprising that the financial classes in Rome came to regard Lucullus as their bitterest enemy and used every means to attack his position¹.

V. LUCULLUS' INVASION OF ARMENIA

Though allowing him the royal state to which he was accustomed, Tigranes had refused for twenty months to see his father-in-law, keeping him almost a prisoner in one of his castles. Appius Claudius, whom Lucullus had sent to demand his surrender, found Tigranes still absent in Syria and utilized the interval before his return in intriguing with his subjects. Appius may have lacked the gift of persuasion which had extracted Jugurtha from the court of Bocchus, but it is probable that Lucullus had no expectation that Tigranes would agree to his demands, and sought only a pretext for invading Armenia and curtailing the power of its sultan. Soon after Appius' return the last strongholds in Pontus were reduced. In the following year (69 B.C.), leaving Sornatius with 6000 men to hold the country, Lucullus marched with the rest of his forces to the invasion of Armenia. It was a daring move, but

¹ Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 23; Appian, *Mithr.* 83. See V. Chapot, *Province Romaine...d'Asie*, p. 41.

one that would have been justified, if Lucullus had contented himself with the demonstration of Roman power at Tigranocerta¹.

Drawing his supplies from Ariobarzanes, Lucullus marched across Cappadocia to the great crossing of the Euphrates near Melitene. The river was in flood but subsided sufficiently to allow Lucullus to cross without delay, in boats prepared during the previous winter by the king of Cappadocia². He was well received and supplied by the people of Sophene, whose belongings he protected against the soldiery, and continued his march south-east, on the road later followed by Corbulo³, for Amida (Diarbekr) on the Upper Tigris. The very audacity of the movement took Tigranes by surprise. Since the withdrawal of Appius Claudius the king had granted Mithridates a force of 10,000 men for the recovery of Pontus and was himself contemplating an invasion of southern Asia Minor. The news of Lucullus' advance was treated with incredulity. At last the king sent out a force under a favourite, Mithrobarzanes, who had dared to tell him the truth, with orders to bring Lucullus alive. The force was destroyed and its leader slain, and in the confusion which prevailed at the Armenian court Lucullus struck hard at the capital.

The statements of the ancient authorities regarding the site of Tigranocerta are so contradictory, that without fresh epigraphic evidence it is improbable that the views of any modern explorer will find universal acceptance⁴. Tacitus⁵ places it 37 Roman miles

¹ The invading force is given by Plutarch (*Lucullus*, 24) as 12,000 infantry and rather less than 3000 cavalry, by Appian (*Mithr.* 84) as two legions and 500 cavalry. At Tigranocerta Lucullus commanded 10,000 legionaries, apart from the 6000 men besieging the city (Plutarch, *op. cit.* 27). We may conclude that he marched with three legions and a strong force of cavalry. The numbers of the Armenians are variously given, the highest total being Appian's 250,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry. Plutarch's figures, which profess to be based on Lucullus' dispatches (*op. cit.* 26), are not less fantastic. The more moderate figure of 80,000 given by Memnon (57) for the Armenian force at Tigranocerta perhaps represents the nominal strength of the standing army. According to Phlegon (frag. 12) the united strength of Mithridates and Tigranes was 40,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry. He is wrong in supposing that Mithridates was present at the battle, but we learn from Memnon (55) that he had received a force of 10,000 from Tigranes, which makes the figures given by the two writers equal.

² Sallust, *Hist.* iv, 59 m.

³ Tacitus, *Ann.* xv, 26. By way of Kharput (*C.I.L.* iii, *Suppl.* 6741/2), and Arghana Maden.

⁴ For an admirable summary of the ancient evidence and results of modern exploration see Rice Holmes, *Roman Republic*, i, pp. 409-425.

⁵ *Ann.* xv, 5.

from Nisibis (the site of which is well known), and Strabo¹ states that Tigranocerta and Nisibis lay in Mygdonia at the foot of the Masian mountains, a range which runs parallel with the Anti-Taurus and is separated from it by the upper waters of the Tigris. But our narratives of the campaign imply that the city lay on the left bank of the Tigris, which Lucullus had first to cross, and that Tigranes, flying northwards on his approach, withdrew into the Anti-Taurus. If the testimony of Strabo and Tacitus may be disregarded, the accounts of Lucullus' campaign would point to Meiafarkin (Martyropolis), first identified as Tigranocerta by von Moltke, which lies some 40 miles to the north-east of Diarbekr.

On the approach of the Romans, Tigranes abandoned his treasures and harem in Tigranocerta, entrusting the defence of the city to Mancaeus, and retired within the shelter of the Armenian mountains to assemble his army. To intercept the levies Lucullus sent forward two detachments, one of which captured Tigranes' baggage train, the other destroyed a band of Arabs on their way to join the king. He himself laid siege to Tigranocerta. The town was of enormous strength and the investing army so insufficient, that a force sent by Tigranes, alarmed for the safety of his concubines, was able to penetrate the Roman lines and bring away both them and a part of the royal treasure. Although the Romans could make little headway, the defenders protecting themselves with arrows and destroying the siege works with naphtha, the siege was maintained as the surest means of bringing the king to battle. When his mobilization was complete, Tigranes, in spite of urgent messages from Mithridates and the advice of Taxiles, advanced from the hills to destroy the Roman force 'too large for an embassy, too small for an army.'

On the morning of October 6, Lucullus, leaving Murena with 6000 men before the town, moved out to meet Tigranes. The armies were separated by a river and to reach the ford by which he could cross, Lucullus was compelled to march along the bank of the stream, which here makes a bend to the west. The Armenians interpreted the manœuvre as a retreat and were surprised when the head of the column wheeled to cross the stream. Their heavy cavalry, armed only with the lance but with men and horses protected by armour, were stationed on the right of the line, below a small hill which had been left unguarded. Lucullus at once sighted the omission. Under cover of a flank attack by his Thracian and Galatian horse, he himself with two cohorts made his way

¹ XI, 522; XVI, 747.

round to the rear of the enemy and occupied the hill. He then gave orders that without waiting to discharge their javelins the troops should close at once on the enemy's rear and strike at the riders' legs, which were not protected by armour. The battle was won. Thrown into confusion by the attacks on their flank and rear, the cavalry stampeded, involving the closely packed infantry in their flight, even before the greater part of it could come into action. A terrible slaughter followed all along the line, the Roman troops, who had received stringent orders against stopping for plunder, pursuing and slaughtering the demoralized enemy over some fifteen miles (69 B.C.)¹. The battle was followed by the capture of Tigranocerta, where the Greek mercenaries of the garrison had mutinied against Mancaeus.

A large part of the southern dominions of Tigranes now came over to the Romans, Arab tribes, the people of Sophene and of Gordyene, whose king had previously been tampered with by Appius Claudius and had paid the penalty to Tigranes. Overtures were also received from the kings of Commagene and of Parthia. On the advice of Mithridates, Tigranes also had been seeking help from Parthia, offering to restore the territory previously captured, together with the valleys which had been the price of his own redemption (p. 357). Lucullus is said to have heard of these negotiations and to have contemplated an attack on Parthia, even sending orders to Sornatius to bring up the forces in Pontus. The troops, however, refused to march, and the news becoming known in Lucullus' camp increased the difficulties already becoming felt between Lucullus and his men.

That Lucullus intended to denude Pontus of its garrison seems incredible, but the fact remains that his relations both with his troops and with Rome were becoming more and more strained. His enemies of the equestrian party, mindful of his conduct in Asia, were accusing him of needlessly prolonging the war for his own purposes, and about this time the government was forced to withdraw from him the province of Asia; not long afterwards Q. Marcius Rex, the consul of 68 B.C., was designated to succeed him in the following year in Cilicia. His troops were becoming weary of the long campaigns and of his rigorous discipline, while the protection granted to Greek inhabitants of captured cities and their property was a further cause of murmuring among the Fimbrians.

¹ For a plan of the battle, if placed at Meiafarkin, see Eckhardt, *Klio*, x, 1910, p. 102. A plan as postulated by Sachau's identification of Tigranocerta with Tell Ermenek (south of the Masian mountains) is given *ib.* p. 109.

Nevertheless, Lucullus prepared in the following year for a final settlement with Tigranes.

Tigranes, who had fled precipitately from the field of Tigranocerta, was joined by Mithridates, all thoughts of the recovery of Pontus being for the time abandoned. The concessions which Tigranes was prepared to make to Parthia may be ascribed to the influence of Mithridates, who was now entrusted with the preparations for the further defence of Armenia. Stores were accumulated for the provisioning of the troops, fresh levies were called up and, so far as time permitted, were armed and organized on the Roman model; in particular, a large force of cavalry was assembled to harass and delay the enemy in his advance. Owing to the lateness of the Armenian season, it was not until the summer of 68 was well advanced that Lucullus began his march northwards.

Apart from a fairly certain inference, to be drawn from Plutarch's narrative, that Lucullus advanced by a route to the west of Lake Van and that he retired by a different road to the east of the lake, there are few indications of the exact line which he followed. To the west of the lake two alternative routes would bring him into the plain of Musch, where his foraging parties were subjected to violent attacks by the Armenian horse, though his attempts to bring on the pitched battle which he desired were unsuccessful. To achieve this object Lucullus decided to march on Artaxata, the capital of Armenia proper, and force the king to fight, as he had done by his threat to Tigranocerta. As the Romans were ascending the valley of the Arsánias (the eastern Euphrates), Tigranes and Mithridates appeared on the opposite bank with the obvious intention of fighting. Lucullus crossed the river with his army in two divisions, drove off the enemy's light horse, and uniting his forces defeated the heavy cavalry under Tigranes and put the whole army to flight. The march on Artaxata was continued, but the rigours of the Armenian tableland, with its early frosts and snow, and lack of provisions, proved too formidable. The men werespent, and, when Lucullus rejected their plea to retire, refused to move. The advance was abandoned, and retiring by a road to the east of Lake Van, the army arrived at Nisibis. Late in the year Lucullus attacked and captured the town, which was held by the brother of Tigranes and Callimachus the defender of Amisus, and there prepared to winter (68-67 B.C.).

In spite of the second defeat on the Arsánias, the Armenian forces were still numerous, while the discipline of the Roman army was rapidly breaking down as the result of reports of the hostility to Lucullus in Rome and the intrigues of Publius Clodius,

the 'soldier's friend,' in the camp. Rumours were current that Lucullus had been superseded and that the Fimbrian troops had been released from service by special decree. No sooner had Lucullus retired from the highlands than the kings delivered their counterstroke. While Tigranes struck at isolated Roman detachments in the south, Mithridates with 4000 of his own troops and 4000 Armenians broke out from northern Armenia and advanced by the Lycus valley into the heart of his kingdom. The Roman forces in Pontus, under Fabius Hadrianus, were taken by surprise; the Thracian mercenaries of Mithridates, now in the Roman service, deserted to their former master, and the natives, after a brief experience of Roman rule, welcomed his return with joy. After two unsuccessful engagements, the second of which only the fortunate wounding of the king enabled him to break off, Hadrianus threw himself into Cabeira, where he was blockaded.

When Mithridates first advanced into Pontus, Lucullus had been prevented from returning, partly by the necessity of relieving the troops attacked by Tigranes, partly by lack of provisions for the march and the mutinous state of his troops, who were loth to leave their present quarters for a winter campaign. But on the news of Hadrianus' reverse the troops agreed to follow him. In the meantime, Hadrianus had been relieved by Triarius, who was marching from Asia to join Lucullus and had turned northwards to succour his colleague. In face of their united forces Mithridates withdrew across the Iris to Comana, but, as the Romans approached the river, he turned to attack them on the march. He himself recrossed the river and engaged Triarius, issuing orders to a part of his forces to cross by a second bridge and intervene when the enemy was fully engaged. The scheme failed owing to the collapse of the bridge, and Mithridates was forced to retreat. Both armies then retired behind fortifications for the rest of the winter, Triarius to Gaziura, covering the road to Amasia and Amisus¹.

It was essential for Mithridates to force an engagement before Lucullus could arrive. Early in the year 67 he moved out from his winter quarters and endeavoured to provoke the Romans to battle. Triarius, who was aware of his intention, at first refused to be drawn out, but when Mithridates attacked the fort of Dadasa, which contained the baggage of the Roman troops and much of the booty of the campaign, Triarius was forced by the clamours of the soldiery to move out and protect it. In the Scotian hills, some three miles from Zela, he was attacked by the Pontic army and defeated, with a loss of 7000 men, 24 tribunes and 150 centurions.

Lucullus arrived soon after the disaster and endeavoured to

¹ *J.H.S.* xxi, 1901, p. 58 sq.

repair the position by bringing Mithridates to battle. The king, however, avoided the error into which Triarius had fallen. Tigranes was advancing and already his advance-guard was in touch with the Romans. Mithridates retired to Talaure¹, a powerful fortress where he could await the arrival of Tigranes, against whom Lucullus now resolved to turn. But the Fimbrians broke out into open mutiny and in answer to the personal appeals made to them by the general flung their empty purses on the ground and bade him fight the enemy alone, since he alone knew how to get rich thereby. Lucullus appealed for assistance to Marcius Rex, the proconsul of Cilicia, but was refused on the ground that his troops were unwilling to march. M'. Acilius Glabrio, who under a Lex Gabinia of 67 B.C. had been appointed to the command of Bithynia and Pontus and was hurrying to an easy triumph, now refused to move beyond Bithynia. While Mithridates recovered the greater part of his kingdom and Tigranes plundered Cappadocia, Lucullus was compelled to remain inactive. By the end of the summer the greater part of the Fimbrians had deserted.

In the operations at Cyzicus and Tigranocerta Lucullus won for himself a high place among the great tacticians; his strategical schemes were boldly conceived and methodically executed. If at times he seems to err on the side of rashness, it is to be remembered that he had greater opportunities of calculating the strength of an adversary than his modern critics. The reason for his failure lay in his leadership. In his enforcement of discipline and his demands upon his men Lucullus followed his master Sulla, but, unlike Sulla, failed to relax when a crisis had been passed. It is true that a genuine love of the Greeks and wider considerations of policy frequently induced Lucullus to deny to his troops the pleasures of a sack, which Sulla would gladly have permitted; but Lucullus, while careful for the most part of the lives of his men, lacked the chief requisite in a commander of caring first for their well-being. In his Armenian campaign he demanded more than the legionary could endure, and with the re-emergence of Mithridates it seemed to the dispirited troops that there was no end to the demands that would be made upon them. While there is no doubt that Lucullus was the real conqueror of Mithridates, it is not to be denied that the Roman government, whatever its motives, was right in superseding him.

¹ Dio xxxvi, 14. The site is unknown. Mr Munro's suggestion (*loc. cit.*) that it is identical with the later Sebasteia (Sivas) is only tenable if Mithridates was trying to oppose Lucullus' march from Melitene. According to Appian (*Mithr.* 90) Mithridates withdrew on Lucullus' approach into Armenia Minor.

VI. THE CLIMAX OF PIRACY: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POMPEY

The organization of the pirate forces, which had been growing during the First Mithridatic War when their fleets were serving with those of Mithridates (p. 242), had rapidly reached a remarkable perfection. The lighter type of vessel, the *myoparo* and *hemiolia*, was giving place to the bireme and trireme. The whole fleet, which was said to number 1000, was organized in squadrons commanded by admirals (*strategoi*), their vessels being lavishly adorned with gold, silver and purple. This attention to appearance reveals a new spirit in the piratical marine and distinguishes the Cilician warships from the dirty craft which normally practised piracy in the Mediterranean. In other respects they differed from the ordinary skulking pirate and even the peaceful sailor of antiquity. The excellence of their seamanship was such that their vessels could keep the seas even in winter and by speed and skilful handling could outstrip any pursuer. Their bases on the Cilician coast were well equipped with munitions and stores, their arsenals manned with captives chained to their tasks, while the numbers of the pirates themselves were constantly increased by men broken by the wars and misgovernment of the time, who joined them as the one escape from ruin.

By this time the pirates swarmed over the whole Mediterranean. We have already seen them assisting Sertorius in 81 B.C.; negotiations were being carried on with Spartacus in 70 B.C.; during Verres' praetorship in Sicily (73-71 B.C.) a pirate squadron destroyed the guardships off the coast and entered the harbour of Syracuse under the eyes of the governor. In the Third Mithridatic War the pirate vessels were again at the disposal of the king, who on one occasion, when in danger of shipwreck, had no hesitation in transferring himself to the vessel of an arch-pirate. Not all of the bands who infested the Mediterranean at this time can have been Cilicians; piracy had raised its head everywhere. But a common spirit animated all the groups, the closest connection being maintained all over the Mediterranean, so that when the safety of those in one area was threatened they could count on reinforcements and money reaching them from another.

The condition of the inhabitants of the Mediterranean coasts during these years was lamentable. Secure in the impotence of Rome and the support of his fellows, the pirate stayed openly on shore, carrying his raids inland and attacking towns, which he

took by storm or siege. Four hundred cities are said to have been captured, islands such as Delos and Aegina were overrun, and the coasts were becoming deserted. Even if due allowance is made for rhetorical exaggeration of their depredations, there is nevertheless a long list of towns and temples which were sacked; in the list of well-known Romans who were captured at sea or on land occur the names of Julius Caesar, Clodius, and Antonia, the daughter of the commander in the campaign of 102 B.C. She was carried off from the neighbourhood of Misenum on the Italian coast, to which the pirates were now paying particular attention, partly owing to the richer booty to be obtained, partly from motives of policy, since by attacking Italy itself it was the more easy to terrorize the provincials. In Italy the neighbourhood of Brundisium and the coasts of Campania and Etruria were the most dangerous. Two Roman praetors were carried off with their insignia, the Appian Way was no longer safe, a consular fleet was destroyed in the roads at Ostia, ships dared not put out from Brundisium except in winter, the corn-supply of the capital was threatened and Rome was faced with the prospect of a famine.

It is not surprising that the business classes and the people united to demand that drastic action should be taken. After a short struggle against senatorial opposition Pompey was appointed with the widest powers (see above, p. 345 *sq.*). He is said to have raised 20 legions, 270 ships and 6000 talents¹. One of his first measures was to secure the food-supply of the capital, where his appointment had at once been followed by a fall of prices.

Pompey had realized that the pirates could only be dealt with by means of simultaneous action over the whole Mediterranean. For this purpose the Mediterranean and Black Seas were divided into thirteen commands, each district being placed under the control of one of his *legati*, who was made responsible for the rounding up of pirate forces and the reduction of enemy strongholds within his district². Special arrangements were made for co-operation between the group-commanders so as to isolate the scattered bands of pirates and frustrate their known tactics of reinforcing threatened units. One of the most important of the local commands was that held by Terentius Varro, who received the naval crown after this campaign. His sphere of operations extended from Sicily to the Cyclades, and from the straits of Otranto to the

¹ The most satisfactory discussion of these figures is by P. Groebe, *Klio*, x, 1910, pp. 375 *sqq.*

² For the details of the distribution of Pompey's forces, see *Annals of Archaeology*, x, 1923, pp. 42 *sqq.*

African coast. While his patrols closed the straits of Otranto to prevent the pirates of the Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts from issuing from the Adriatic, he also maintained contact in the south with the *legatus* in charge of the African coast, forming an effective barrier between the eastern and western halves of the Mediterranean and facilitating Pompey's scheme of clearing the west first. In the east the most interesting command is that of Q. Metellus Nepos. His district is described as Lycia, Pamphylia, Cyprus and Phoenicia. There was no question of any attack on the Cilician strongholds of the pirates until the rest of the Mediterranean had been cleared and Pompey himself was ready to deliver a direct attack on the Cilician coast. Metellus' business was to engage the pirates as they issued from the Cilician ports or sought to retire thither. Any that escaped him and endeavoured to fly westwards would fall in with Varro's patrols. The remaining commands were disposed in such a way as to cover the whole of the Mediterranean coast-line.

The campaign opened in the early spring of 67 B.C. with simultaneous attacks on the pirates in the various commands. Pompey himself with a mobile squadron of sixty ships swept the western seas, driving the scattered pirates on to the stationary forces already assembled. This part of his task was completed in forty days, and he was able to return to Rome to secure the good behaviour of his political opponents, before leaving for the East.

By the time he reached the East the cause of the pirates outside Cilicia had become desperate. After the victories of Lucullus at sea (p. 362) they had been deprived of the help of Mithridates. Now the overwhelming forces arrayed against them and the moderation which was shown towards captives induced numbers to surrender and reveal the hiding-places of the rest. There remained, however, the reduction of the fortresses of Cilicia, to which the most desperate had fled and were preparing for a final resistance. A powerful force equipped with siege-engines and prepared for all kinds of mountain warfare was made ready, the pirate fleet was defeated off Coracesium, and Pompey laid siege to the fortress. It was one of the most powerful in Cilicia, an eyrie on a precipitous rock above the sea and connected with the land only by a narrow isthmus. But resistance was hopeless; the defenders of Coracesium capitulated and were followed by the rest of the pirates throughout Cilicia.

The whole campaign had been completed in the short space of three months. It was a masterpiece of strategy, but Pompey's greatness is shown even more in the settlement adopted after his

victory. Realizing that one of the chief causes of piracy was to be found in the misery of the times, he made due provision for the future of the survivors. Ruined men, who had joined the pirates in despair, were given a new start in life and transferred to inland districts where they were unlikely to relapse into their old habits. Many of them were settled in cities which had been depopulated, in Dyme in Achaea and the towns of Cilicia Pedias recently depopulated by Tigranes. It was long ago suggested that the old man of Corycus whom Virgil knew in Calabria was a reformed pirate who supported his old age by bee-keeping¹.

We are told that Pompey's moderation provoked some amount of criticism among his political opponents. More justifiable was the censure he incurred by another of his actions at this time. After the overthrow of Antonius (above, p. 356) wiser counsels had prevailed in Crete, and an embassy was sent to Rome to arrange the best terms possible. By personal appeals to individual senators the ambassadors contrived that a motion should be introduced into the Senate to the effect that the Cretans should again be received as friends and allies of the Roman people. The motion however was blocked by a tribune, and on the receipt of further complaints about Cretan behaviour an ultimatum was sent to the island. The Cretans were ordered to surrender their leaders with 300 hostages, to hand over their ships and pay an indemnity of 4000 talents of silver. The terms were rejected, and Q. Caecilius Metellus, the consul of 69, was sent with three legions to reduce the island.

Metellus set about his task with unnecessary brutality, with the result that the Cretans, hearing of Pompey's moderation, preferred to make their surrender to him. Pompey unwisely sent Octavius, an officer of his own, to the island. Finding himself ignored and the communities which had surrendered to him attacked by Metellus, Octavius sent to Greece for troops and, after the death of the colleague who brought them, endeavoured to meet Metellus by force. A minor civil war had broken out in Crete, Octavius joining one of the Cretan leaders and with him standing a siege in Hierapytna. But on the approach of Metellus himself Octavius withdrew and left him to complete the conquest of the island unhindered².

¹ Servius on *Georgics*, iv, 125.

² Gortyn appears to have joined Metellus against her rival Cnossus, becoming in consequence the capital of Roman Crete. The Gortynians struck coins at this time in honour of Metellus with a head of Roma and an elephant's head, the device of the Caecilii, as symbols. See J. Friedländer in *Zeit. f. Num.* x, 1883, pp. 119 *sqq.*, and Vol. of Plates, iv, 12, a.

VII. POMPEY'S CAMPAIGNS IN 66 B.C.

The resounding achievement of Pompey marked him out as the man destined to complete the work of Lucullus, to succeed where Lucullus had failed or had seemed to fail. Neither Q. Marcius Rex in Cilicia nor M'. Acilius Glabrio in Bithynia had proved other than incompetent, and the Romans realized that in unity of command lay the key to victory. By the Lex Manilia early in 66 B.C. Pompey was re-appointed High Admiral of the Roman fleet, was nominated governor of Cilicia and Bithynia, and was charged with the conduct of operations against the kings of Pontus and Armenia (see above, p. 348 *sq.*).

On receipt of this commission Pompey moved forward from his winter-quarters in Cilicia to the upper Halys. Here he had a preliminary trial of strength with Lucullus, who vented his chagrin at being superseded by ignoring Pompey's arrival and issuing orders for the pacification of the provinces conquered by him (and since lost)¹. At the instance of their friends the rival commanders agreed to a conference in eastern Galatia, which began with an exchange of formal compliments and ended in volleys of vituperation. In subsequent proclamations Pompey derided Lucullus as a tragedy general, whose victories were mere stage effects; Lucullus likened Pompey to a carrion bird, come to feast on others' kill. This war of manifestos, however, was more degrading than dangerous, for Pompey, with law and force alike on his side, soon reduced Lucullus to impotence. He gave orders that Lucullus' edicts should be treated as dead letters, and detached from him the remnant of his soldiery, save a posse of 1600 men (presumably invalids) to escort him home.

Before he delivered his attack upon Mithridates, Pompey sent an envoy to suggest a friendly accommodation. After some delay the king asked for the Roman terms, but on being informed that he must lay down his arms, hand over his deserters, and place himself at Pompey's discretion, he broke off negotiations. No doubt Mithridates did not require the reminder which he received from his corps of Italian refugees, that these would use force to prevent their extradition. But Pompey could hardly have had a serious expectation that Mithridates would surrender without a further trial of arms. The real issue of the diplomatic campaign depended

¹ The law of Sulla, which allowed outgoing governors thirty days' grace after the arrival of their successors (p. 297, n. 5), left room for such conflicts of competence. A similar clash occurred in Cilicia in 51 B.C. between Appius Claudius and his successor Cicero.

on the result of two rival embassies which Pompey on the one hand, and Mithridates and Tigranes on the other, sent to the Parthian king Phraates (p. 603). Although the price which Pompey offered for his assistance—the restoration of western Mesopotamia—was no higher than that which Lucullus had promised in 69 B.C., and which Tigranes was still prepared to pay, the Parthian king now overcame his long hesitations and took open sides with Rome. In coming to this decision Phraates no doubt paid homage to Pompey's formidable reputation, but his policy was chiefly influenced by a son and namesake of the Armenian king, who had fled to the Parthian court because his father was unconscionably slow in dying and dangerously quick in sending undutiful sons before him.

The effect of the alliance between Pompey and Phraates was that while the Parthian king held Tigranes, Mithridates was left to face the Romans single-handed. Since his return to Pontus the king had recruited an army of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse, but in this force only the mounted men and the shrunken remnant of the Italian refugees were fit for hard fighting. Despite the impotence to which Lucullus had been reduced in 67 B.C., Mithridates had not ventured to pit his recruits against him in open battle, but had contented himself with forays into Bithynia and Cappadocia; in 66 B.C. he found himself outnumbered and outmatched by the reconstituted Roman forces. In addition to the field-armies used by him against the pirates, and the troops stationed in Bithynia and Cilicia, Pompey had appropriated the remainder of Lucullus' soldiers, and by the magic of his name he had induced most of the veterans discharged from Lucullus' service to re-enlist. His total numbers, exclusive of such allied contingents as he requisitioned from the king of Cappadocia and the Galatian chieftains, may be estimated at no less than 50,000 men¹.

In the summer of 66 B.C. Pompey ordered his fleet to patrol the coasts of Asia Minor, and with his army advanced from Galatia into Pontus. Employing the same strategy that he had used against Lucullus in 73 and 72 B.C., Mithridates fell back towards the valley of the Lycus, along which ran his main line of lateral communications, and sought to wear out his enemy in a campaign of raids and forays. Pompey, who had apparently not made any extensive drafts upon the mounted forces of his Cappadocian and Galatian allies, had not enough cavalry to meet Mithridates on equal terms in guerrilla warfare. He therefore attempted to break off by a

¹ On the strength of Pompey's army, see J. Kromayer in *N. J. Kl. Alt.* xxxiii, 1914, p. 160.

side movement up the Lycus valley towards Armenia Minor, so as to cut off Mithridates from Tigranes, and to threaten his numerous treasure-castles in that region (p. 233). But Mithridates headed Pompey off, and barred his passage by occupying the rock-fortress of Dasteira (probably on the site of the later city of Nicopolis¹). Resuming the guerrilla war round this position, the Pontic king again held the Romans at a disadvantage, until his horsemen, repeating the mistake which they had made in 72 against Lucullus, became over-eager, and were destroyed in an ambushade. Having disposed of the Pontic horse, Pompey was free to replenish his supplies. At the same time the arrival of the reserve army, which he had called up from Cilicia, enabled him to draw a fortified ring round Dasteira. After a blockade of forty-five days Mithridates deceived the Roman night-watches with false flares and extricated all his army except the wounded. The king now endeavoured to slip away to Armenia; but his success in stealing away from Dasteira had been too complete. By saving his baggage-train he retarded his rate of march, so that Pompey, creeping round by hill tracks, was able to occupy unobserved a chain of bluffs commanding a gorge of the Lycus and cutting across the enemy line of retreat. In the ensuing night (the third after the flight from Dasteira) he threw the Pontic camp into confusion by a sudden discharge of missiles from the overlooking heights, and broke in upon it before the combatants could disentangle themselves from the stampeding baggage-train. Once again, as at Cabeira, Mithridates cut his way out. But the 'battle of Nicopolis' (to use the accepted but not quite accurate name) proved an irreparable disaster.

Once more an exile from his kingdom, Mithridates passed into Greater Armenia and invoked the aid of his son-in-law Tigranes. But the Armenian king gave his guest an even chillier welcome than in 72 B.C. While Mithridates was engaged with Pompey, Tigranes had been driven back upon his capital Artaxata by the Parthian king, and had been held there under blockade; but when Phraates prematurely drew off part of the investing force, the Armenian king sallied out and scattered the remnant of the besieging army, which Phraates had left in charge of Tigranes' rebel son. The younger Tigranes' first thought now was to obtain assistance from Mithridates, but when he heard that Mithridates was himself in quest of aid, he turned off to find Pompey. Meantime, however, the news of his intended overtures to the Pontic

¹ On this identification, see Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator*, p. 385 n.; J. G. C. Anderson, *J.R.S.* XII, 1922, pp. 99 sqq.

king had reached his father's ears, and brought seeming confirmation of the Armenian monarch's suspicions in regard to his neighbour. Accordingly Tigranes answered Mithridates' request for help by setting a price upon his head. The Pontic exile made a hurried flight from Armenia to Colchis, and secured himself for the ensuing winter at the harbour of Dioscurias.

Meanwhile Pompey, having lost touch with Mithridates, ordered a blockade of the Black Sea ports, but did not press the pursuit. His army no doubt needed rest, for he left a sufficient number of wounded and sick men at Dasteira to form the nucleus of a new settlement, the future city of Nicopolis. But at the invitation of the younger Tigranes he crossed the Euphrates and advanced down the Araxes valley towards Artaxata. Not far from this town he met the Armenian king, who completely lost his nerve at Pompey's approach and made an abject surrender. Thus Pompey ended the Armenian wars without a further battle.

The campaign of 66 B.C. closed with a brief passage of arms in the valley of the river Cyrus, where Pompey pitched his winter camps under the shelter of Mt Caucasus. His occupation of the Armenian borderland alarmed the neighbouring Albanians, a nomad folk whose grazing grounds lay between the Cyrus, Mt Caucasus and the Black Sea. On the day of the Saturnalia (December 17) their chieftain Oroezes, taking advantage of the division of Pompey's force into three separate cantonments, attempted a triple surprise on the Roman leaguers. But Pompey and his lieutenants were on their guard, and beat off their ill-armed opponents with heavy slaughter.

VIII. POMPEY'S LATER CAMPAIGNS

In the spring of 65 B.C. Pompey resumed his tardy pursuit of Mithridates. Anticipating resistance by the Iberians—a well-organized agricultural folk, with an Iranian governing class, who dwelt in modern Georgia—he crossed the frontier passes and overawed their king Artoces into granting him passage across the Cyrus. Mistrusting a sudden flight by Artoces into the recesses of his realm, Pompey pursued him and made short work of his troops in a battle in which the Roman legionaries rushed the Oriental archers, like the Athenians at Marathon. After receiving the submission of Artoces, the Roman general proceeded unhindered along the Phasis to the Black Sea coast, where he rejoined a detachment of his fleet. From the Phasis estuary he

threaded his way for a short distance along the coast, but found his further progress barred by the insurmountable cliffs of the Caucasus outspurs. For a second time Pompey left Mithridates to the care of his navy, and devoted the rest of 65 B.C. to the systematic conquest of the Albanians in the Caspian borderland. This seemingly superfluous campaign may be explained by a desire on Pompey's part to develop a trans-Caspian trade-route to the farther East¹—a scheme which had occupied Seleucus I and was to engage the attention of Nero. But probably his main object was to gain the glory of a triumph over peoples whose very names were new to the Romans. Returning to the Cyrus valley by a detour through Armenia, he crossed the river without opposition, and similarly effected the passages of the Cambyses and the Abas. Beyond this last stream he enticed the Albanian forces into a miniature battle of Cannae, encircling them with his horsemen from right and left. After receiving the submission of King Oroezes Pompey marched without further hindrance towards the Caspian. But at three days' distance from that lake he turned back, and re-crossing Armenia for the last time he ended the year's campaigns with the capture of Mithridates' remaining treasure-castles in Armenia Minor. His retreat from Albania was no doubt dictated by regard for his army, which had suffered from drought and dysentery on the summer marches, and found its way to the Caspian impeded by an adder-infested country². With the fate of Lucullus before his eyes Pompey could not venture to overdrive his men.

After the capitulation of King Tigranes the relations between Pompey and the Parthians underwent a sudden change. An attempt which Phraates made in 65 B.C. to recover from Tigranes the borderland of Gordyene (on the upper Tigris) was promptly foiled by Pompey, who detailed his lieutenants Afranius and Gabinius to occupy the debatable territory. The Parthian king hereupon withdrew his troops and asked Pompey for a new treaty. But the Roman general, who seemingly saw in Phraates a half-hearted ally and enemy, and perhaps was toying, like Lucullus before him, with the idea of Roman conquests in Babylonia, refused his request, and addressed him in disdainful and even provocative terms. Yet in 64 B.C., when Phraates renewed his attack upon Tigranes, Pompey contented himself with sending

¹ According to Pliny (*N.H.* vi, 52), Pompey made inquiries as to the length of the Caspian route to India.

² Here Plutarch (*Pompey*, 36) is clearly right against Dio (xxxvii, 5, 1), who asserts that Pompey actually reached the Caspian.

three commissioners to patch up a peace. Having restored Gordyene to Tigranes, Afranius and Gabinius were sent on to Syria. While Afranius cleared the passes through Mt Amanus of brigands, Gabinius took possession of Damascus, where he was presently reinforced by M. Scaurus¹.

After a winter spent in Armenia Minor, Pompey proceeded in the spring of 64 B.C. to Amisus on the Pontic coast, where he gave audiences to client-kings and made a provisional settlement of Asia Minor. While engaged in this task he recovered touch with Mithridates. In the previous year the fugitive king had skirted the Black Sea coast from Dioscurias to the Caucasus, and with an improvised fleet had slipped past the Roman naval patrols to the Taman peninsula. From this position he opened war upon his son Machares, who had made his peace with Lucullus in 70 B.C. and had been acknowledged by him as ruler of Mithridates' Russian dominions. By the prestige of his name Mithridates at once recovered the allegiance of the native chieftains on the east side of the Sea of Azov, and fomented revolt against his son in the Crimea. With another ready-made fleet he crossed the straits of Kertch and cornered Machares in Panticapaeum, where the rebel, unable to gain his father's ear by repeated embassies, was driven to suicide². Having thus recovered his Russian provinces, Mithridates applied to be restored to Pontus as a vassal of Rome. But Pompey, who had no mind to sign another treaty of Dardanus, required Mithridates' personal submission, and the king, more stiff-kneed than Tigranes, rejected these terms.

Still trusting to the slow pressure of his naval blockade upon Mithridates, Pompey followed his advance detachments to Syria. Since the expulsion of Tigranes by Lucullus this land had relapsed into its previous state of anarchy. The Seleucid prince Antiochus XIII Asiaticus, whom Lucullus had acknowledged as rightful ruler of Syria, had been kidnapped by Sampsiceramus, a sheikh of Emesa, and Philip II, a grandson of Antiochus VIII Grypus, had replaced him at Antioch. But the authority of this King of Brentford hardly extended beyond the city gates. The countryside from desert to coast was overrun with robber-bands, and such of the towns as had not succumbed to petty dynasts like Sampsiceramus were left to fend for themselves. In Palestine the

¹ The chronology of the Roman occupation of Syria, as given in Josephus' *Jewish Antiquities*, is sadly confused. His account in xiv [3, 1], 34-6, is here followed as against that of xiv [2, 3], 29-33.

² So Appian, *Mithr.* 102. Dio (xxxvi, 50, 3) states that Machares was killed by his own supporters at the instigation of Mithridates.

aggressions of the Maccabaeae dynasty had been suspended by a family feud between the two sons of Alexander Jannaeus, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus II (p. 401 *sq.*). But this dispute was serving the no less dangerous ambitions of the Nabataean ruler Aretas III, who had taken the field in aid of Hyrcanus and invested Aristobulus in Jerusalem (65 B.C.). It is true that in this same year, or early in 64 B.C., the Jewish dispute was temporarily settled by Gabinius and Scaurus, to whom both the pretenders had offered substantial bribes for recognition. Pompey's lieutenants, believing that Aristobulus would pay his footing more promptly and with better grace, decided in the younger brother's favour, and Aretas raised the siege of Jerusalem when Scaurus advanced against him from Damascus.

The rest of 64 and part of 63 B.C. were spent by Pompey in restoring order in Syria. This he accomplished by sending out detachments in all directions to round up the robber-bands, to demolish the pirate forts on the coast, and to bring the dynasts to submission. In the autumn of 64 he received deputations from Hyrcanus, appealing against Gabinius and Scaurus, and from Aristobulus, in defence of their award, but he put off the suitors until the ensuing year.

In the spring of 63 B.C. Pompey moved from Antioch to Damascus, where he received Hyrcanus and Aristobulus in person. Uninfluenced by a gift of a golden vine, valued at 500 talents, from Aristobulus, he decided against the younger pretender. Herein he plainly acted in Rome's best interests, for Aristobulus was a true scion of the Maccabaeae conquerors, whereas Hyrcanus had no political ambitions beyond the royal title. But for the moment Pompey made no announcement of his award, and took no overt action against Aristobulus. For the time being, he was preoccupied with preparations for an expedition to Petra, the capital of King Aretas. In this project the desire to acquire an important centre of the perfume and spice trade may have counted for something, but its principal object no doubt was to win for Pompey the distinction of extending Roman authority to the Red Sea. But Pompey had not proceeded far on the way to Petra before he began to suspect that Aristobulus had divined his intentions and was meditating resistance. His suspicions were confirmed when Aristobulus, having obeyed an order to surrender his other fortified positions in Palestine, returned to Jerusalem and prepared for war. On arriving at Jericho he summoned Aristobulus and overawed him into a promise that he would receive a Roman force into Jerusalem and pay an indemnity. But Aristobulus

bulus was not able to redeem this undertaking, for his officers refused to admit Pompey's lieutenant Gabinius into the city. Hereupon Pompey put Aristobulus under arrest and diverted his march towards Jerusalem. He took possession of the lower town and the palace quarters without resistance, but was compelled to lay siege to the Temple precincts. He collected materials for filling the deep ravine under the Temple plateau, and brought up artillery from Tyre. But it was not until the third month of the siege that he overcame the natural strength of the position and the stubbornness of its defenders. The first Roman over the fortress walls was Faustus Sulla, son of the dictator.

The capture of Jerusalem was the last of Pompey's military achievements in the East. Whether his ambition was now satisfied, or whether, as seems more likely, he had taken to heart recent murmurings among his troops, who complained that Pompey was forgetting Mithridates over these distant adventures, he did not resume the interrupted campaign against Petra. In 62 B.C. he sent a force under Scaurus against Aretas; but this commander achieved no more than to harry his territory, and at the suggestion of Hyrcanus' minister Antipater (father of King Herod) he withdrew the Roman troops on payment of a blackmail¹.

IX. EGYPT

While Pompey was sweeping up the débris of the Seleucid monarchy, he came within striking distance of Egypt. Here the Ptolemaic dynasty had since the death of Ptolemy VI Philometor, its last worthy representative (vol. VIII, pp. 284, 525), become increasingly impotent to maintain order within its own house, and had ceased to be a power in Mediterranean politics. Its record of domestic strife and of palace revolutions is highly melodramatic, but historically unimportant.

After the death of Philometor in 145 B.C., the claims of his young son were set aside by a party in Alexandria, which had previously favoured the deceased king's brother, Ptolemy Euergetes II, nicknamed Physcon, and could now point to the dangers attendant upon a long minority reign by the lawful heir to the crown. Physcon, who had never acquiesced in his relegation to Cyrene, at once acted at a signal from his supporters and occupied the Egyptian capital, apparently without opposition. He also came to

¹ Four years later Scaurus, as curule aedile, did not scruple to issue coins on which Aretas was shown as a suppliant kneeling beside a camel. See Vol. of Plates, iv, 12, *b*.

terms with Cleopatra II, the sister and widow of Philometor, who consented to a second brother-marriage in order to recover a share of the throne, and made no overt protest when her new husband put her child by Philometor out of the way. But when Physcon repudiated Cleopatra II in favour of her daughter by Philometor, Cleopatra III, the divorced wife appealed to the Alexandrians, who once before had made and unmade Physcon (vol. VIII, p. 284), and now for a second time turned against the ruler of their own choice. As the nickname Physcon ('Puffing Billy') declares, the city mob took offence at the physical appearance of their king, who had carried the hereditary corpulence of his family to monstrous proportions; and they no doubt were genuinely incensed at his treatment of Cleopatra II, for a chivalrous regard for distressed queens was their redeeming virtue¹. With the help of his mercenary troops Physcon repeatedly beat down the Alexandrian rioters, but in 131 or 130 B.C. he was at last driven out to Cyprus, and Cleopatra assumed sole rule at Alexandria. By way of reproving her unwifely conduct, the exiled king murdered their only child and sent her the body, with limbs torn asunder according to the rules laid down for villains in Greek mythology, as a present for her birthday. In 129 B.C. he won his way back to Egypt, and outwardly at least he arrived at a fresh understanding with the queen. Meanwhile, however, the dynastic conflict had extended to the country, where the troops and the natives took sides for king or queen and waged a confused and protracted civil war.

The eventual restoration of order in Egypt was marked by an Act of Grace issued in 118 B.C. in the name of the king, of 'Queen Cleopatra the Sister,' and of 'Queen Cleopatra the Wife².' In this notable ordinance the rulers confirmed all existing titles of possession in land, remitted all debts to the crown, and proclaimed an amnesty for recent political offences. For the future, they sternly admonished their officials to desist from the manifold extortions and oppressions which they had practised with impunity under cover of the civil war. This indulgence followed upon a series of similar proclamations at the close of previous periods of domestic strife³. It was also in keeping with the general policy of the Ptolemies in the second century, which acknowledged the need

¹ The status of the two Cleopatras, aunt and niece, evidently caused perplexity to the Ptolemaic officials in the country. In the papyri of the period either Cleopatra, or both, are cited as queens without any apparent system.

² *P. Tebtunis*, I, 5.

³ E.g. in 164-163 B.C. (Wilcken, *Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit*, vol. I, nos. 110-111); and in 145 (*P. Turin*, I, pp. 9, 21).

of making concessions to native unrest. Not only did these later rulers copy the example of the third-century kings in treating the indigenous priesthood with respect and in setting up new temples to the Egyptian gods, but they began to throw open the higher administrative offices to the native population. In the rebellions of the reigns of Physcon and of Lathyrus (p. 388) native officers were entrusted with military commands; and under Ptolemy Auletes an Egyptian was promoted to the post of Epistrategus or Governor-General of Upper Egypt, an office which had been created by the fifth Ptolemy for the very purpose of quelling disorder in that province¹.

The continuous domestic conflicts of the second century left an enduring mark upon the economic condition of Egypt. The area of cultivation fell back from the limits to which the early Ptolemies had expanded it; and the native peasantry, unable to overthrow their Greek masters by active rebellion, had recourse to the weapon of passive resistance, and made concerted refusals to take up leases on the Crown Lands. It is true that partial compensation for these losses was found in a new development of commerce with the lands of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The stimulus which the eastern trade received was in some measure due to the active interest of Ptolemy Physcon and Cleopatra III. About 120 B.C. Physcon engaged a Greek venturer, Eudoxus of Cyzicus, to explore the open-sea route from Aden to India under the guidance of a castaway Hindu who had offered to reveal to him the secret of the monsoons; and after this king's death Cleopatra III equipped a second expedition for the same captain, who returned successfully from both cruises with a cargo of spices and precious stones. Owing to a dispute about the sharing-out of the proceeds, Eudoxus did not stay on in the Ptolemaic service, and it was probably not until the time of Augustus that Greek navigators definitely discovered the law of the monsoons and made the Indian Ocean familiar to Greek enterprise². But the Ptolemies continued to take the eastern trade under their special protection, and the Epistrategus of Upper Egypt was charged with the patrol of the Red Sea and the waters beyond Aden³. Yet the increment in commerce

¹ Various minor alterations in the routine of finance and jurisdiction are recorded in the papyri of the second century B.C. It will suffice here to note the creation of an *Idiologos* or Keeper of the King's Privy Purse (in or before 162 B.C.), in whom some scholars (with doubtful reason) see the prototype of the *Procurator Rei Privatae* of the Roman Emperors.

² Strabo II, 98-99. On Indian Ocean exploration under the later Ptolemies, see E. H. Warmington, in Cary and Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers*, pp. 70-72.

³ *O.G.I.S.* 132, 186.

under the later kings did not make up for the shrinkage in agricultural production. It is significant that while Philometor and his successors continued to strike good silver (in a Cyprian mint) for purposes of commerce, they restricted the issue of coins for internal use to copper pieces. A heavy drop in the weight of the copper drachma under Philometor should probably be interpreted as a species of State bankruptcy, of which the Ptolemies set the example to the Caesars¹.

In 116 B.C. Ptolemy Physcon died in peace. By his testament he left his widow Cleopatra III to rule Egypt in association with either of her two sons by him²; but he constituted Cyrenaica into an appanage for an illegitimate offspring named Ptolemy Apion. By this disposition Cyrenaica, which Physcon had temporarily reunited to Egypt in 145 B.C., was definitely separated from it. At Alexandria Cleopatra had selected her younger child to succeed his father, presumably because she deemed him more pliable to her will. But the city mob again took matters into their own hands and compelled the queen-dowager to transmit the crown to the elder son. Thus Ptolemy VIII, officially styled Soter II, but popularly nicknamed Lathyrus ('Chick-Pea'), became king at Alexandria, while the junior brother was appointed governor of Cyprus. At first, it is true, Cleopatra had little cause to regret the disarrangement of her plans, for Lathyrus deferred to his mother to the extent of dismissing his wife and sister Cleopatra IV, and marrying in her stead a younger sister, Cleopatra V (Selene). Eventually Lathyrus showed signs of assuming the part of Nero in opposition to his mother's Agrippina, but Cleopatra III forestalled him by framing against him an accusation of attempted murder, which the Alexandrians accepted in good faith. In 108-107 B.C. a riot in the capital compelled Lathyrus to take flight, and his brother returned from Cyprus to reign in his stead as Ptolemy IX Alexander I. But the fugitive king contrived to raise a force in Syria and to assume possession of Cyprus, so as to reverse the parts between the two brothers.

These conflicts within the Ptolemaic dynasty influenced the parallel movement of domestic discord among the Seleucids. The divorced queen Cleopatra IV sought compensation for the lost crown of Egypt by marrying a Seleucid pretender, Antiochus IX Cyzicenus. Had Cyzicenus succeeded in establishing himself firmly at Antioch, no doubt she would have prompted him to

¹ Th. Reinach, *Rev. E.G.* xli, 1928, pp. 170 *sqq.*

² Since nothing is heard of Cleopatra II at this juncture, it may be assumed that she had died shortly before Physcon.

avenge her dethronement by resuming the secular warfare between Seleucids and Ptolemies. But in 112 B.C. Cyzicenus lost his capital to a rival dynast, Antiochus VIII Grypus (vol. VIII, p. 531), and Cleopatra was hacked to pieces at the altar of Apollo at Daphne, to which she had fled for sanctuary. This sacrilege casts a fierce light upon the curse that was working itself out among the Ptolemies in mutual murder, for the ex-queen's executioner was her own sister Cleopatra Tryphaena, the wife of the victorious Grypus. Nemesis claimed her next victim in the following year, when Tryphaena fell into the hands of Cyzicenus and was immolated to her murdered kinswoman.

Not long after these events Ptolemy Lathyrus, having followed his first wife into exile, renewed her attempt to recover Egypt by way of Syria. With an army recruited in Cyprus he landed at Ptolemais on the Palestinian coast, and as protector of the Greek cities of the seaboard and ally of Cyzicenus, he made war upon the Hasmonaeen Priest-King Jannaeus Alexander. At Asophon near the Jordan he won a battle in which thirty thousand of Jannaeus' troops are said to have been killed, and for one moment it appeared as if Coele-Syria might become once more a Ptolemaic dependency. But his plans were crossed by his mother, the queen-regent Cleopatra III, who made alliances with Jannaeus and Antiochus Grypus, and led an expedition into Palestine. Lathyrus, it is true, slipped past Cleopatra's army and made for Pelusium, but he was headed off by his mother's naval forces and presently retired to Cyprus, abandoning all his gains. At the same time Cleopatra withdrew to Egypt, and Coele-Syria once for all passed out of Ptolemaic hands (see below, p. 399).

After the death of Cleopatra III, which befell about 101 B.C., Ptolemy Alexander I became ruler as well as king of Egypt, only to discover that the Alexandrians had tolerated him merely to please his mother. He fell under suspicion of having removed his mother by foul play, and his unpopularity was increased by his ungainly figure, which swelled out to the same proportions as that of his father Physcon. In 89 B.C. a military émeute compelled him to flee the country, and although he presently recaptured Alexandria with a mercenary force from Syria, he was promptly driven out again by the city mob, which he goaded to fresh rebellion by despoiling the tomb of Alexander the Great in order to pay off his foreign soldiers. A second attempt on his part to fight his way back with troops levied in Lycia was headed off by the Egyptian fleet, and the exiled king lost his life in a naval battle (88 B.C.).

The death of Ptolemy Alexander I made room for his brother

Lathyrus, who now returned from Cyprus and was accepted by the Alexandrians without demur. But the second half of his reign in Egypt was troubled with a renewal of unrest in the Thebais. Despite recent concessions to the native Egyptians, each fresh disorder in Alexandria, by bringing heavier taxes in its train, or conferring greater licence of oppression upon the officials, was an incitement to further rebellion. At Thebes, moreover, the memories of the national uprising against the alien Hyksos (vol. I, p. 314 sq.) had been kept alive by the powerful priesthood of Amen, among whom leaders for a new revolt against foreign domination readily offered themselves. In 88 B.C. the Ptolemaic troops became involved in a three years' war in Upper Egypt which ended in the destruction of Thebes.

In 80 B.C. Lathyrus died without legitimate male issue. With the concurrence of the Alexandrians his daughter Berenice, who had previously been married to her uncle Ptolemy Alexander I, took the government into her hands. But she had reckoned without a son of Ptolemy Alexander by a former wife. This prince, who had been relegated by his grandmother, Cleopatra III, to the island of Cos, beyond the reach of Alexandrian factions, had fallen captive to Mithridates of Pontus in 88 B.C. (p. 243), but had subsequently escaped to the camp of Sulla and had been taken by him to Rome. Shortly after the death of Lathyrus he presented himself at Alexandria with a warrant from Sulla which the Alexandrians did not dare to dispute. The *protégé* of the Roman dictator was accordingly proclaimed as Ptolemy X Alexander II, and by taking Berenice to be his queen he apparently satisfied her claims to power. But on the morrow of the marriage a new struggle for ascendancy within the Ptolemaic house began; the king procured the murder of his refractory consort, and on the nineteenth day of his reign was himself lynched by the city mob, incensed at the death of their favourite princess.

In the absence of any legitimate claimants to the throne, the Alexandrians now raised up two illegitimate sons of Lathyrus, one of whom was made king of Egypt, while the younger brother was sent to Cyprus, where he established a virtually independent rule (see p. 527). The new Egyptian monarch, not content with the official titulature of Ptolemy Theos Philopator Philadelphos, added to this list the name of Neos Dionysos; but he was popularly known as Auletes (the 'Piper'), a nickname which summed up his accomplishments. But however acceptable Auletes might be to the Alexandrians, he had assumed power without the consent of Sulla, and as the supplanter of the dictator's nominee. He therefore created

an 'Egyptian Question' in Roman politics, and reigned under the shadow of Roman intervention.

In 168 B.C. the Roman Republic had interfered drastically in defence of the Ptolemies against Antiochus IV of Syria. But once the danger of a Seleucid conquest of Egypt had been averted, its interest in the affairs of that country had become very desultory, and in the disputes between Ptolemy Philometor and his brother Physcon it had been but a half-hearted arbiter (vol. VIII, p. 283 *sq.*). To the advocates of imperial expansion at Rome Egypt indeed offered a tempting prize. Despite the misgovernment of the later Ptolemies, it still possessed a large funded treasure and might at short notice be converted into one of Rome's chief granaries. Amid the family feuds of the ruling dynasty specious pretexts for Roman interference would not be far to seek, and to the military resources of the Republic the natural defences of Egypt could offer no protracted obstacle. It may be not wholly without political significance that in the later half of the second century the Romans showed various signs of interest in the Ptolemaic kingdom. Roman merchants settled at Alexandria¹; Roman senators made tours of inspection up the River Nile²; in 140 or (more probably) 135 B.C. Scipio Aemilianus in person paid a visit to Physcon and brought away a vivid impression of the ample natural resources of the country³. On the other hand, it was the set policy of the governing aristocracy of the later Republic not to burden itself with additional duties of overseas administration, and it had no less reason than the Roman emperors in later times to fear that a province of Egypt might serve as a base for an ambitious proconsul bent on personal aggrandizement. The Senate therefore allowed Ptolemy Physcon and his sons to fight out their dynastic wars without interference. The same insouciance was displayed by the Roman government in 96 B.C., when Ptolemy Apion died and bequeathed his principality of Cyrene to the Republic. Though it was not loth to receive into its hands the lucrative trade in silphium from that district, and accordingly sent a commissioner to take charge of the late king's domains, it left the government of Cyrenaica in the hands of the Greek cities, upon which it conferred

¹ *O.G.I.S.* 135.

² *P. Tebtunis*, I, 33 (112 B.C.). An exhortation by a *dioiketes* to a subordinate to receive a Roman Senator deferentially (and to feed the sacred crocodiles for his amusement).

³ Diodorus xxxiii, 28 a; Posidonius, *ap.* Athen. xii, 549 D; Plutarch, *Moralia*, 200 E. For the date of Aemilianus' visit, see Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides*, II, p. 68 n. 1.

freedom. In the winter of 87–86 B.C. Sulla's lieutenant Lucullus, finding Cyrene at feud with its neighbours and a prey to petty tyrants, settled its affairs for the time being. But it was not until 74 B.C. that the Senate, intent on closing the Mediterranean coast-lands to the pirates (p. 442), definitely converted Cyrenaica into a Roman province.

The visit of Lucullus to Cyrene was an incident on a voyage to Alexandria, where Sulla had instructed him to borrow the Ptolemaic fleet for use against Mithridates. Though he was received with every mark of deference by Ptolemy Lathyrus, he was unable to move the king from his attitude of anxious neutrality. The rebuff which Sulla thus received from Lathyrus was no doubt the reason which determined him in 80 B.C. to impose a nominee of his own upon Egypt. If it be true that he dictated to his client, Ptolemy X Alexander II, the testament produced at Rome after the king's death, in which he followed Ptolemy Apion's example in bequeathing his realm to Rome, we may conclude that Sulla intended to gather in Egypt for the Republic by the same policy of 'lapse' which Lord Auckland applied to the native kingdoms of India. Yet neither he nor the restored senatorial government after him took any steps to avenge the death of Ptolemy Alexander, or to give force to his supposed testament; and when Crassus, for reasons of his own, proposed the annexation of Egypt to the People, the Senate's spokesmen carried the day against him (p. 480). Therefore when Pompey entered Palestine, the Egyptian Question remained unsettled, and Ptolemy Auletes was still in possession of the throne. He realized the wisdom of currying favour with Pompey and in 63 B.C. sent 8000 cavalry to his assistance, but since this implied renunciation of the Ptolemies' own claim to Palestine, he increased his unpopularity in Egypt. In 62 Pompey could easily have found a pretext for supporting Ptolemy with military force and anticipating the exploits of his lieutenant Gabinius in 55 B.C. (p. 604). But for the time being he did nothing to repay the service rendered. At the end of 63 he went into winter-quarters at Amisus, and he spent the next year in Asia Minor, putting the finishing touches to his political settlement.

X. POMPEY'S SETTLEMENT OF THE EAST

While Pompey was on his march towards Petra, he had received news of the death of Mithridates. In leaving this enemy to be reduced by the Roman blockade Pompey took the same risks as Scipio Africanus in 208 B.C., when he lost touch with Hasdrubal

Barca (vol. VIII, p. 87); but the gamble was equally justified by events. Not that Mithridates was in danger of starvation in the Russian cornlands. He used his respite to raise a new fleet and an army of 36,000 men equipped in Roman fashion. With this force, and with auxiliaries recruited among the Balkan peoples, he planned a march up the Danube and across the Carnic Alps into Italy—a concept worthy of Hannibal or Attila. But this extreme effort, which the king pursued with unflinching determination, overstrained the loyalty of his subjects, who saw their very plough-cattle commandeered, and of his soldiers, none of whom, and least of all the Roman renegades, were willing to face an invasion of Italy. Early in 63 a revolt broke out at Phanagoreia (on the east side of the Kertch straits) and spread to the Crimea. Mithridates suppressed the insurrection with indiscriminating severity, yet he pardoned a favourite but discontented son named Pharnaces. In giving this grace he incited the culprit, who distrusted his father's mercy, to seek assurance in a second plot. At the head of the mutinous soldiery Pharnaces entered Panticapaeum and drove his father into the citadel. From this last refuge Mithridates attempted negotiations, but finding Pharnaces more merciless than himself, he massacred his remaining children and his harem, and attempted his own life with poison. Finding the poison ineffectual—for by a lifelong diet of prophylactics he had rendered himself immune beyond his own wish—he obtained death from one of his Celtic bodyguards.

The Roman Republic never encountered a stouter adversary in the East than Mithridates. His physical power and mental energy, which remained unabated to the end of his sixty-eight years of life, recalled those of the giants of Alexander's age. By his administrative talents he made the Oriental monarchy into a worthy successor of the dying Hellenistic kingdoms. He fostered the growth of commerce and of city life in Pontus, and out of its rising revenues he built up an army which he trained in Greek fashion, and re-drilled, like Vercingetorix, on a Roman pattern. In preparation for his conquests, he practised the various devices of diplomacy. He made a bid for the sympathy of the Hellenic populations by patronizing Greek artists and literary men; he held off the Romans by humouring them until he was ready to strike. Above all, his courage and resilience in adversity were never equalled among Rome's eastern antagonists. In his last hopeless struggle against Pompey, Mithridates displayed a stubborn pluck like that of a wounded boar returning again and again to the charge.

But success against the Roman Republic required either a

military genius or a prophet and leader of a holy war. For the rôle of a crusader Mithridates was wholly unfitted, for as a personality he struck cold: though he knew how to buy servants, he could not win friends. As a father and husband he out-Heroded Herod; in his political dealings he stooped to assassination, whether by his own poniard or by the mass-attack of head-hunters. Moreover, in breed and culture he was a hybrid whom neither East nor West could claim as its own¹. The Greeks who allied themselves with him were bound by nothing but the precarious tie of a common dislike of Rome; the Iranian nobility of his realm saw in him a despot rather than a compatriot. Furthermore, if Mithridates was a great war-minister, he was not a great general. A capable leader of guerrillas, he won skirmishes but lost battles, and while in his earlier wars he was well served by his Greek subordinates, Diophantus and Archelaus, in his last struggle against Rome he disposed only of his own mediocre talents. In a trial of strength against the new professional army of Rome, led by three of the Republic's ablest generals, he protracted the conflict to the uttermost, yet he achieved no more than to delay a defeat that was certain.

Under the terms of the Lex Manilia Pompey carried out a general settlement of the Near East, without the assistance of the usual decemviral commission from the Senate. To safeguard Roman authority, and to secure peace by land and sea, he enlarged two of the existing provinces and created two new ones. Bithynia was extended to the river Halys or, more probably, to the Iris². Cilicia was enlarged by the permanent and effective occupation of the coastland as far as Lycia, and of the inland districts of Lycaonia, Pisidia and southern Phrygia³. The island of Crete was annexed by right of conquest over the pirates; Syria was incorporated partly for strategic reasons of frontier defence, partly to give its

¹ It is significant that Mithridates regarded the Anatolian, Iranian and Hellenic cults in his realm with indifferent favour. He was in no sense a precursor of Mohammed.

² See Map 11, facing p. 396. The statement that the eastern boundary of Bithynia was fixed at the Halys rests on a doubtful interpretation of Strabo xii, 544. (B. Niese, *Rh. Mus.* 1883, pp. 577 *sqq.*) From Strabo xii, 547, where it is said that the seaboard east of the Halys was shared between the Galatian Deiotarus and the city of Amisus (which presumably was included in the Roman province), it may be inferred that the frontier-line was formed by the river Iris.

³ These inland regions had been nominally under Roman rule since 102 or at all events since 84 B.C., but they were not effectively annexed until after the pirate wars.

people that protection against inland raiders and corsairs on the coast, which the last Seleucid kings had failed to supply¹. By these acquisitions the whole seaboard of Nearer Asia, with the exception of Lycia, of the territories of Cyzicus and of Pontic Heraclea, and of eastern Pontus, was brought under direct Roman rule.

But where military considerations did not impose a policy of annexation, Pompey adhered to the established Roman principle of leaving the administration of the eastern lands to the dependent kings or city-states. In the Black Sea region he confirmed Pharnaces in the possession of his father's Russian dominions; he conferred the eastern half of the Pontic coastland, from the Halys or the Iris to Trapezus, together with the title of king, upon the Galatian chieftain Deiotarus; he left the seaboard of Colchis in the hands of a dynast named Aristarchus. The kings of Iberia and Albania were, nominally at least, enrolled as Roman vassals. In the interior of Asia Minor Pompey recognized several petty dynasts: Attalus and Pylaemenes in the mountainous inland of Paphlagonia, Tarcondimotus in the recesses of Mt Amanus. To Brogitarus, chief of the Trocmi in eastern Galatia, he gave a slice of inland Pontus with the town of Mithridatium. Whether he bestowed upon Deiotarus other territories than the eastern coastland of Pontus is not certain. But since this chieftain is found not long after in possession of Armenia Minor and of central Galatia (the land of the Tectosages) in addition to his native dominion of western Galatia, it seems not unlikely that he received these other territories from Pompey².

On the Euphrates border Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia and Antiochus of Commagene were confirmed in their several kingdoms and received the adjacent strips of Mesopotamia as bridge-heads. Lastly, Pompey did not follow the secularizing policy of the earlier Seleucids in regard to the great temple-domains of Asia Minor (vol. VII, p. 183), but left them under ecclesiastical administration. At the sanctuary of Ma at the Pontic Comana he appointed Archelaus, son of Sulla's former antagonist, as High

¹ On the importance of occupying the coast of Syria as a safeguard against piracy, see J. Dobiaš, *Archiv Orientalni*, III, 1931, pp. 244 *sqq.*

² Cicero's statement (*Phil.* II, 37, 94) that Deiotarus received Armenia Minor from the *Senate* does not exclude the possibility that the Senate herein acted in concurrence with Pompey: indeed it is not easy to find an occasion on which that body could have made a grant to Deiotarus without Pompey's consent. The statement of Strabo (XII, 547) that Deiotarus' new possessions in eastern Pontus extended *as far as* Armenia Minor should perhaps not be pressed.

Priest. Beyond the Euphrates he apportioned the debatable territory of Mesopotamia in disregard of his previous treaty with the king of Parthia. Instead of recovering the whole of this country from Tigranes, Phraates was put off with the district of Adiabene (round Nineveh), while Tigranes was allowed to keep Gordyene (round Nisibis); and Osrhoëne (in the loop of the middle Euphrates) was assigned to an Arab sheikh named Abgarus, who, officially styled Abgar II, was commissioned to hold open the gate for an eventual Roman advance into Mesopotamia (see further below, p. 603 *sq.* and Map 14, facing p. 612).

On the outskirts of the Syrian province Pompey reinstated Sampsiceramus of Emesa, Ptolemy of Chalcis, and several other petty dynasts, and he restored Damascus to the Nabataean kingdom. He recognized Hyrcanus as High Priest and ruler of Judaea, but withheld from him the title of king. Furthermore, he detached from Judaea the entire seaboard from Gaza to Mt Carmel, the district of Samaria, and a cluster of ten towns (henceforth called the Decapolis) extending along the Jordan from Pella and Scythopolis to the Dead Sea, so that the Hasmonaean dynasty lost all its acquisitions save Idumaea, Peraea and Galilee (p. 403).

In the new or enlarged provinces Pompey regulated the details of administration by special charters. In Bithynia the 'Lex Pompeia' was still in force in the days of the younger Pliny¹. The most distinctive feature in Pompey's administrative arrangements was the stimulus which he gave to city life in the Near East. Thirty-nine towns of Asia Minor and Syria were reckoned as his foundations; in Pontus alone eleven cities were established by him². In some instances Pompey merely reconstituted older cities which had become depopulated under the stress of pirate raids, of prolonged warfare, or of Tigranes' transplantations: thus Pompeiopolis in Cilicia was a substitute for Soli³. Elsewhere he formed new urban centres by drawing together the inhabitants of the adjacent villages. At Nicopolis he created a mixed community of natives and of invalid soldiers from his army; but this is the only known instance in which he settled Italian colonists on Asian soil.

In the cities founded or re-organized by him Pompey followed the usual practice of prescribing a property qualification for ad-

¹ *ad Traian. imp.* 79, 80, 112, 114, 115.

² These included Diospolis (on the site of Cabeira), Megalopolis (subsequently renamed Sebasteia), and Magnopolis (the successor of Mithridates' colony of Eupatoria).

³ The bronze coins of the new city bear the head of Pompey and the figure of Athena, the chief deity of Soli. See Vol. of Plates, iv, 12, c.

mission to political offices; but in other respects he gave them a full measure of autonomy. He likewise maintained the liberties of the older cities (including Antioch, Seleuceia on the Orontes, and the Phoenician towns), and confirmed the grants of self-government which Lucullus had made to Sinope and Amisus in Pontus. In the dominion of Pharnaces Phanagoreia was declared a free town, and similar privileges were no doubt assured to other cities outside the direct sphere of Roman rule. A sporadic coinage in bronze and silver suggests that Pompey generally conceded the right to issue money, although not many of the towns actually exercised it.

But if the cities of Asia Minor for the most part became 'liberae,' only a few highly favoured towns like Rhodes and Cyzicus remained 'immunes.' In general, the cities were required to pay the tithe on the produce of their lands to which they had been liable under their former rulers. Similarly all the kings, dynasts and high priests of the dependencies this side of the Euphrates were called upon to make a yearly contribution; the peasants of the crown lands of Bithynia and Pontus transferred their former tithes to the Roman exchequer¹. The collection of the provincial revenues was left, according to the usual practice of the Roman Republic, in the hands of publicani who underwrote the risks of an uncertain yield under the quota system. But the collection of dues from the individual tax-payers on the municipal territories was left to the municipal authorities, who made collective bargains with the Roman tax-farmers².

At his triumph in September 61 B.C. Pompey exhibited placards declaring that he had conquered 1538 cities or strongholds and a population of 12,178,000 souls, and that he had carried Roman arms to the Sea of Azov and the Red Sea. These claims were partly untrue and for the rest gave a false impression. It is true that Pompey had exhibited great powers of strategic planning in the pirate war, and considerable tactical ability in the campaigns of 66 and 65 B.C.; and he had won the obedience of his troops without giving them the usual licence to plunder. Yet the taunt which Lucullus had hurled at him, that he had merely come to reap

¹ Little is known of Pompey's arrangements in regard to the extensive crown lands and royal domains of Bithynia and Pontus. Probably a considerable part of these territories was made over to the municipia, new or old. It is uncertain whether he took any steps to emancipate the serf populations on the royal domains and the temple domains. The important mines of Pontus were no doubt leased to *entrepreneurs*.

² On Pompey's arrangements for tax-collection, see T. Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 323 sq.

what others had sown, was not without foundation. Lucullus, fighting against heavy odds, had broken the backbone of Mithridates' and Tigranes' armies; Pompey, with superior forces, delivered the finishing stroke at an enemy already crippled, and his only victories in the field over unbeaten antagonists were gained at the expense of half-civilized peoples like the Albanians and Iberians.

Yet Pompey's term of command in the East is a landmark in the history of Rome and of Nearer Asia. To the Roman Republic Pompey brought the largest increment of wealth that accrued from any of its foreign wars. After distributing a bounty of 384 million sesterces (£3,360,000) among his soldiers, he still had 480 million sesterces (£4,200,000) left to pay into the treasury, and he augmented the annual tributary revenue of Rome from 200 million to 340 million sesterces. In return for the taxes and indemnities levied by Pompey, the peoples of the Near East obtained peace such as they had not enjoyed since the fall of the Persian Empire. The seas were all but cleared of corsairs, Syria was delivered from anarchy, and apart from some lesser disorders due to the growing ambitions of King Deiotarus, Asia Minor long remained immune from war. In his settlement with Parthia, it is true, Pompey sowed the seeds of future trouble, but with Syria and the Euphrates crossings in the hands of Rome and her allies, a Parthian attack could henceforth be met, and usually was met, by a Roman invasion of Parthian territory. Lastly, in fostering city life in Asia Minor and Syria Pompey gave a new impulse to the diffusion of Hellenic civilization, and prepared for the economic renaissance of the Near East under the early Roman emperors. Though Pompey's conquests have little of the glamour of Caesar's Gallic Wars, they will bear comparison with these in their ultimate effects upon the course of ancient history.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abh. Arch.-epig.	Abhandlungen d. archäol.-epigraph. Seminars d. Univ. Wien.
A.J.A.	American Journal of Archaeology.
A.J.Num.	American Journal of Numismatics.
A.J.Ph.	American Journal of Philology.
Am. Hist. Rev.	American Historical Review.
Arch. Anz.	Archäologischer Anzeiger (in J.D.A.I.).
Ἀρχ.	Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς.
Arch. Pap.	Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
Arch. Relig.	Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
Ath. Mitt.	Mitteilungen des deutschen arch. Inst. (Athenische Abteilung).
Atti Acc. Torino	Atti della r. Accademia di scienze di Torino.
Bay. Abh.	Abhandlungen d. bayerischen Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
Bay. S.B.	Sitzungsberichte d. bayerischen Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
B.C.H.	Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique.
Berl. Abh.	Abhandlungen d. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin.
Berl. S.B.	Sitzungsberichte d. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin.
Boll. Fil. Class.	Bollettino della Filologia Classica.
B.P.W.	Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift.
B.S.A.	Annual of the British School at Athens.
B.S.R.	Papers of the British School at Rome.
Bursian	Bursian's Jahresbericht.
C.I.G.	Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum.
C.I.L.	Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.
C.J.	Classical Journal.
C.P.	Classical Philology.
C.Q.	Classical Quarterly.
C.R.	Classical Review.
C.R. Ac. Inscr.	Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
Dessau	Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae.
Ditt. ³	Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum. Ed. 3.
D.S.	Daremberg and Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines.
E. Brit.	Encyclopaedia Britannica. Ed. 11.
F. Gr. Hist.	F. Jacoby's Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.
F.H.G.	C. Müller's Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum.
G.G.A.	Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
Gött. Abh.	Abhandlungen d. Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen.
Gött. Nach.	Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-hist. Klasse.
Harv. St.	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.
Head H.N. ²	Head's Historia Numorum. Ed. 2.
Heid. S.B.	Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaft.
H.Z.	Historische Zeitschrift.
I.G.	Inscriptiones Graecae.
I.G.R.R.	Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes.
Jahreshefte	Jahreshefte d. österr. archäol. Instituts in Wien.
J.D.A.I.	Jahrbuch des deutschen archäologischen Instituts.
J.E.A.	Journal of Egyptian Archaeology.

J.H.S.	Journal of Hellenic Studies.
J.I. d'A.N.	Journal International d'Archéologie Numismatique.
J.P.	Journal of Philology.
J.R.A.S.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
J.R.S.	Journal of Roman Studies.
Klio	Klio (Beiträge zur alten Geschichte).
Mém. Ac. Inscr.	Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres.
Mem. Acc. Lincei	Memorie della r. Accademia nazionale dei Lincei.
Mem. Acc. Torino	Memorie della r. Accademia di scienze di Torino.
Mnem.	Mnemosyne.
Mus. B.	Musée belge.
N. J. f. Wiss.	Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung.
N.J. Kl. Alt.	Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum.
N.J.P.	Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie.
N.S.A.	Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità.
Num. Chr.	Numismatic Chronicle.
Num. Z.	Numismatische Zeitschrift.
O.G.I.S.	Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae.
O.L.Z.	Orientalistische Literaturzeitung.
Phil.	Philologus.
Phil. Woch.	Philologische Wochenschrift.
P.W.	Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll's Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.
Rend. Linc.	Rendiconti della r. Accademia dei Lincei.
Rev. Arch.	Revue archéologique.
Rev. Belge	Revue Belge de philologie et d'histoire.
Rev. Bib.	Revue biblique internationale.
Rev. Celt.	Revue des études celtiques.
Rev. E. A.	Revue des études anciennes.
Rev. E.G.	Revue des études grecques.
Rev. E.J.	Revue des études juives.
Rev. E.L.	Revue des études latines.
Rev. H.	Revue historique.
Rev. N.	Revue numismatique.
Rev. Phil.	Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes.
Rh. Mus.	Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.
Riv. Fil.	Rivista di filologia.
Riv. stor. ant.	Rivista di storia antica.
Röm. Mitt.	Mitteilungen des deutschen arch. Inst. Römische Abteilung.
S.B.	Sitzungsberichte.
S.E.G.	Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum.
S.G.D.I.	Sammlung der griechischen Dialektinschriften.
St. Fil.	Studi italiani di filologia classica.
Trans. A.P.A.	Transactions of the American Philological Association.
Wien Anz.	Anzeiger d. Akad. d. Wissenschaften in Wien.
Wien S.B.	Sitzungsberichte d. Akad. d. Wissenschaften in Wien.
Wien. St.	Wiener Studien.
Z. d. Sav.-Stift.	Zeitschrift d. Savigny-Stiftung f. Rechtsgeschichte.
Z.N.	Zeitschrift für Numismatik.

CHAPTER VIII

ROME AND THE EAST

A. ANCIENT SOURCES

1. *Inscriptions*

The principal inscriptions dealing with the kingdom of Pontus and the Mithridatic Wars are collected in Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator*, quoted below, pp. 456-472, the most important of which are cited in the text of sections 1-vi from Ditt.³ and O.G.I.S. Inscriptions relating to the Pirate Wars are collected in E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels*, quoted below, Anhang 1, nos. 92, 93, 94, 96, 111. See also S.E.G. 1, 335, III, 378, on the date of which see H. Stuart Jones, *J.R.S.* xvi, 1926, pp. 155 *sqq.* and the literature there cited.

2. *Literary Sources*

Appian, *Mithr.* 64-119; *Sic.* 6; *Syr.* 48, 69-70.
 Cicero, *Brutus*, v, 168; *de imp. Cn. Pompei*; *de lege agraria*, 1, ii, 5; II, xix, 50; *pro Murena*, xv, 33.
 Dio Cassius, xxxvi-xxxvii, 23.
 Diodorus, xl, 1; 4.
 Eutropius, vi, 2-14; 16 (13).
 Florus, 1, 39-42 (III, 4-7).
 Frontinus, *Strat.* 1, 1, 7; II, 1, 12; 3, 14; 5, 33; III, 7, 1; 13, 6.
 Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.* xiv, 2-5, 1; *Bell. Jud.* 1, 6-7.
 Justin, xxxviii-xl.
 Livy, *Epit.* 90-102.
 Memnon, fragments of *History of Heraclea*, 36-60, F.H.G. III, pp. 544 *sqq.*
 Obsequens, p. 104.
 Orosius, v, 23; vi, 2-6, 4.
 Phlegon, in *F. Gr. Hist.* no. 257, fr. 12.
 Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* vi, 17, 52; 26, 97-99; xxxvii, 5, 16.
 Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 5-37; *Pompey*, 24-45; *Sertorius*, 7; 23-24.
 Sallust, *Historiae* (M.), 1, 127-132; II, 47, 71, 80-81, 87; III, 2, 5-6, 19, 54; IV, 12, 18, 56, 58-59, 61, 63, 64-65, 67, 69, 79-80; v, 13-14.
 Strabo, xi, 499-502; 522; 527-533; xii, 540-562; 567-569; xiv, 668-671; xvi, 747.
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B. MODERN WORKS

1. *General*

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ii. *Special Topics*

(a) *The Pirates of Cilicia*

Ormerod, H. A. *Piracy in the Ancient World*. Liverpool, 1924. pp. 190-247.

Ziebarth, Erich. *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland*. Hamburg, 1929. pp. 31-43.

(b) *Individual episodes of the Pirate War*

Ormerod, H. A. *The Campaigns of Servilius Isauricus against the Pirates*. J.R.S. xii, 1922, p. 35. (Criticized by Sir W. M. Ramsay, *J.H.S.* xlviii, 1928, p. 46, and *Klio*, xxii, 1929, p. 381.)

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(c) *Campaigns in Pontus and its topography*

(See also the Bibliography to Chapter v, B)

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